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BEYOND THE WARSAW PACT:  
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE  
IN THE 1990'S

BY  
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Beyond the Warsaw Pact:  
Russian Foreign Policy in  
East Central Europe in the 1990s

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Submitted in partial fulfillment  
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the head long rush of its former East European satellites to rejoin the West have placed Russia in a difficult position. Faced with seemingly insurmountable political and economic difficulties as it makes its transition from communism and a centrally planned economy to its own form of democracy and a market economy, Russia realizes that it needs Western aid and technology. On the other hand, similar attempts by its former East European satellites threaten to isolate Russia from the rest of Europe. In the immediate post-Cold War era, it is the task of Russian foreign policy to prevent Russia's isolation from Europe. A Russia denied the benefits of European trade and political and economic assistance can only sink into domestic chaos. This thesis examines Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War era in relation to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the three East European nations which promise to hold the keys to Russian participation in or isolation from the European system. The thesis examines the Russian national interest in the region, as well as the evolving security and economic relationship between Russia and East Central Europe. The thesis concludes that the task of Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War era is to develop better economic relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

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# **I INTRODUCTION**

On Christmas Eve 1991, the red, white, and blue tricolor of the Russian Republic replaced the red sickle and hammer of the Soviet Union atop the Kremlin in Moscow where it had flown for over fifty years. The changing of the Kremlin flag symbolized not only the end of the Soviet Union, but also the culmination of dramatic changes throughout Eastern Europe that began in November 1989, as one by one the communist governments in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states were overthrown.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the head long rush of its former East European satellites to rejoin the West have placed Russia in a difficult position. Faced with seemingly insurmountable political and economic difficulties as it makes its transition from communism and a centrally planned economy to its own form of democracy and a market economy, Russia realizes that it needs Western aid and technology. On the other hand, similar attempts by its former East European satellites threaten to isolate Russia from the rest of Europe. In the immediate post-Cold War era, it is the task of Russian foreign policy to prevent Russia's isolation from Europe. A Russia denied the benefits of European trade and political and economic assistance can only sink into domestic chaos. It is the purpose of this study to examine Russian foreign policy in relation to



Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the three East European nations which promise to hold the keys to Russian participation in or isolation from the European system.

Not only does the breakup of the Soviet Union pose external political problems for Russia, but as the empire dissolves into fifteen individual republics, the West is faced with the difficulty of having to determine how to deal with the fifteen new entities. Western policy toward the republics of the former Soviet Union is complicated by the fact that since 1917 many in the West have used the terms "Russia" and "Soviet Union" as if they were interchangeable. A brief glance at a map of the old Soviet Union shows that Russia (or the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, now simply Russia) was only one of fifteen union republics. While there was little doubt that Russia was first among equals, it is incorrect nonetheless to equate Russia with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, that equation has colored our thinking for not only the past seventy years, but certainly the past 300 years. However, the new realities of the independence of Ukraine, Belarus' and the Baltic States have resulted in "Russia's" historic European borders being shifted between 300 and 800 miles to the east. In fact, Russia's present European border is roughly that of its predecessor, Muscovy, in 1648. In addition, with the loss of the Baltic states, Russia has lost unlimited physical access to Baltic ports. Although it still controls Kaliningrad and has access to the Baltic Sea through St. Petersburg, the loss of the Baltic States and the reduction of Russia's borders have effectively separated Russia from a Europe to which it so desperately wishes to remain a part.

The fact remains, however, that of the successor states to the Soviet Union, only Russia has the potential to remain a dominant force in the region. Of the successor states to the Soviet Union, Russia retains nearly 51 percent of the population and 76 percent of the area of the former Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> In terms of industrial output, in 1989 Russia was responsible for nearly 91 percent of the petroleum and 77 percent of natural gas production in the Soviet Union, as well as 55.4 percent of the steel production of the old Union.<sup>2</sup> In addition, according to the Russian Board of Statistics, in 1991, Russia accounted for 80 percent of Soviet exports and 59.3 percent of Soviet imports.<sup>3</sup> In the political realm, Russia has agreed to assume 57.8 percent of the former Soviet Union's R1.050 trillion foreign debt,<sup>4</sup> and still retains the bulk of the conventional and nuclear military capability of the *ancien regime*.<sup>5</sup> By comparison, in 1989, Ukraine produced

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<sup>1</sup>Population based on the 1989 census. See Raymond E. Zickel, ed. Soviet Union: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), 804.

<sup>2</sup>Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989 (Moscow: 1990), 338.

<sup>3</sup>"External Trade Drops 38 Percent in 1991" (text), Moscow Interfax in English, 1935 GMT, 7 February 1992. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter cited as FBIS) Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-027, 10 February 1992): 19.

<sup>4</sup>By comparison Ukraine has agreed to take on 17.8 percent (R176 billion) of the former Soviet debt, while Belarus' will assume 3.8 percent (R37.7 billion). Igor Pogosov, "Distribution of Former Soviet Debt Discussed" (text), Moscow Izvestia in Russian, 24 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-018, 28 January 1992): 17.

<sup>5</sup>In terms of conventional military forces, 71 of 130 ground divisions (54.6 percent), 1,400 of 2,160 interceptor aircraft (64.8 percent), and 980 of 3,060 tactical aircraft (32.0 percent) of the former Soviet Army remain on Russian soil. In addition, Moscow claims another 16 divisions in Mongolia and Eastern Europe. In contrast, only 20 divisions, 230 interceptors, and 620 tactical aircraft are on Ukrainian soil. See Alexander Tsygankov, "Lopatin: Three Reform Alternatives" (text), Moscow Moscow News in English, 52 (1991). Joint Publications Research Service (hereinafter cited as JPRS) Report Soviet Union, Military Affairs (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992): 76.

only 9 percent of the Soviet Union's oil and 3.9 percent of its natural gas. Ukraine was also responsible for 34.2 percent of steel production.<sup>6</sup> These facts indicate that Russia, despite challenges from Ukraine, has the potential to be the greatest of the successors to the old Soviet Union.

However, Russia's potential political and economic power in the post-Soviet era does not necessarily mean it will be able to impose its will upon Ukraine and Belarus'. Certainly there are many Russian nationalists, notably Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who still regard Ukraine and Belarus' as inseparable from Russia, an attitude which, just as certainly, has not been lost on either the Ukrainians or the Belarus'.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, at least Ukraine has the capability to resist Russian attempts to influence Ukraine's position in post-Cold War Europe. Despite Ukraine's insistence that it desires to become a nuclear-free state, as long as Russia retains nuclear weapons and continues to harbor sentiments of the union of Russia and Ukraine, and the implied Russian domination that goes along with it, Ukraine will probably keep the nuclear weapons on its soil. Ukraine's ability to use those weapons or to effectively defend its territory is a subject open to debate beyond the scope of this study, but the fact remains that, at least for the near term,

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<sup>6</sup>*Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989*, 338.

<sup>7</sup>Solzhenitsyn, of course, is not the only Russian nationalist who desires maintenance of the historic European borders. In a 29 January 1992, *Pravda* article, Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi denounced the Yeltsin government as a "wrecking team" and called for the restoration of Russia's "historical borders" and a review of its present borders. In a 13 February 1992, interview with *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Rutskoi said he would fight for "reestablishment of a single democratic state united on the territory of the greater Eurasian territory." See Alexander Rahr, "Rutskoi Resumes Attack," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (hereafter cited as *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 30 January 1992. Also Alexander Rahr, "Rutskoi Favours Great Russian State," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 14 February 1992.

an independent Ukraine hampers Russian attempts to influence international affairs in Europe.

Indeed, the increased distance between Russia and the rest of Europe caused by Belarus' and Ukrainian independence forces Russia into a minor state of isolation. At the very least, Russia's new borders complicate its relationship with the rest of Europe, particularly if one considers that historically Russia's ability to influence European affairs has depended largely on the amount of control it has been able to exert over Eastern Europe. For example, Russia's self-proclaimed role as the "*gendarme* of Europe" between 1815 and 1854 was determined by its ability to threaten Europe through its alliance with Austria and Prussia and by stationing Russian troops in Poland. By the same token, the Soviet Union was able to influence European affairs throughout the post-World War II era by the fact that it militarily occupied Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Of course, one cannot overlook the impact the large Soviet nuclear arsenal had upon European politics, but the point here is that, in a sense, Russia's security historically has focused on a certain amount of control over portions of Eastern Europe.

Indeed, it has been the nations of East Central Europe (i.e., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland)<sup>8</sup> which have been the historic keys to Russian security and will continue to

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<sup>8</sup>Not only does the breakup of the Soviet Union dictate a rethinking of relations with its former republics, but the collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe necessitates a redefinition of geographic references throughout the region. In the Cold War era Eastern Europe referred to the European portion of the Soviet Union as well as the satellite states of the Soviet Union, i.e., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania -- the Non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact. Because of their communist governments, Albania and Yugoslavia were also included in the broad definition of Eastern Europe. However, grouping all these states together as "Eastern Europe" ignores cultural and historical differences which set their peoples apart. In the New European Order, Eastern Europe more aptly refers

figure in Russian relations with Europe. Of course, the obvious question is how important will East Central Europe be in Russian-European relations if Belarus' and Ukraine separate the two regions? Indeed, the independence of Belarus' and Ukraine will complicate Russia's European relations; however, if Russia does have desires to reincorporate Belarus' and Ukraine into some new political entity, it is certainly in its strategic interest to develop close relations with the countries to the west of Belarus' and Ukraine -- Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Thus, Russia would be able to isolate Ukraine and Belarus' forcing a new political relationship between Russia and its former dominions.

Even if Russia has no imperial designs on Belarus' and Ukraine, East Central Europe will still remain an important region in Russian foreign affairs for economic and geostrategic reasons. Indeed, in a 6 March 1992 article in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Sergey Rogov, Deputy Director of the United States and Canada Institute, stated, "Although Russia is now separated from [this region]...by a belt of former Soviet republics,

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to the Eastern Slavic nations of Belarus', Russia, and Ukraine. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, geographically located on the Baltic Sea, are, of course, the Baltic States. But more importantly, the Baltic States are grouped together because of a common Germanic ethnic and cultural heritage. While the southern communist states of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, the fragments of old Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and the new, smaller Yugoslavia), and the newly independent former Soviet republic of Moldova represent varied cultural and historic pasts, the political chaos and slow pace of the growth of democracy are endemic to the Balkan region to which they belong. As for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, while they are ethnically Slavic (in the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland), they are culturally Western. Geographically these three nations form a bridge between Eastern Europe and Central Europe, hence the reference East Central Europe.

geopolitically and economically we cannot withdraw from [this] part of the world."<sup>9</sup> Economically East Central Europe still represents a sizeable market for Russian products, especially natural resources. While East Central Europe can get better and cheaper consumer goods from the West, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland receive nearly all of their oil and natural gas from Russia. In addition, although trade between East Central Europe and Russia may be more vital to the Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, and Poles than to the Russians, the economic conditions in which Russia finds itself suggest it cannot afford to disregard any potential market for any product.

In addition, from a geopolitical standpoint, East Central Europe has historically represented the frontier separating Western Europe and the historic Russian state, either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. In a sense, the countries of East Central Europe have formed a highway for both Western political and social culture as well as invading Western armies. By the same token, East Central Europe has served as a garrison location for Russian troops that have threatened Western Europe.

There is also another consideration which may complicate Russian relations with the nations of East Central Europe: the memory of forty odd years of Soviet domination is not likely to disappear quickly. Indeed, the environmental damage caused by industry heavily dependent on cheap Soviet energy and resources will remain a constant reminder of Soviet imperial occupation for some time. Industrial damage to the environment is

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<sup>9</sup>Sergey Rogov, "Security Issues Facing Russia Discussed" (text). Moscow *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* in Russian, 6 March 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-045, 6 March 1992): 18.

compounded by damage caused by Red Army troops in exercises and maneuvers throughout these nations. Perhaps most important is the memory of the thousands who died at the hands of Soviet troops and Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish army and internal security forces throughout the post-war era in demonstrations and revolts against an alien form of government. Yet, despite the damage and suffering caused by the years of Soviet occupation, the nations of East Central Europe realize that a major power lies to their east which they must consider for security and economic reasons.<sup>10</sup>

In examining Russian relations with East Central Europe, this study will begin with an examination of the Russian national interest in the region. Any study of the relationships between nations must begin with an understanding of the motive forces behind any given action a state might take. Chapter III examines the new security relations between the regions, while Chapter IV addresses the changing economic relationship between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland and Russia. The study concludes by presenting policy options Russia might take in its relationship with East Central Europe and implications for the United States.

The world is rapidly changing as new political relationships are forged and old partnerships die. Yet what has gone before, the past actions of states in their dealings with the world, cannot be easily forgotten. The task for Russia is to overcome its

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<sup>10</sup>In this regard, Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated in a March 1992, interview, "An extremely significant element of Poland's foreign policy is its relations with the East, and most importantly with Russia." Vladas Burbulis, "Polish Minister Skubiszewski on Foreign Ties" (text), Moscow TASS in English, 1957 GMT, 17 March 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-053, 18 March 1992): 20.

perception as an imperial power and make an honest effort to rejoin the family of nations.

The key to Russian success, both in internal reform and greater European relations, lies through East Central Europe. Russia's foreign policy failure in this area can only result in the failure of its internal reforms and the onset of political and social chaos.



## II RETHINKING THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped  
in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key  
is Russian national interest. -- Winston Churchill

### A. WHAT IS THE RUSSIAN *NATIONAL INTEREST*?

In order to understand how Russia, or any nation for that matter, will behave in a given situation one must understand the motivations behind a given act. What are those motivations and how does a nation determine the relative importance of a given goal or act? While the answer is simple, defining it is quite difficult. Generally, actions taken by a nation in its relationships with other nations are motivated by the *national interest*. A simple definition of the term would be the "ends" of foreign policy,<sup>11</sup> but such a definition could justify nearly any action a state might take. Examples of national interest in this context might be German occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938 or Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, portions of Poland, and Bessarabia in 1939 and 1940. National interest, however, must encompass much more and must involve an internal political debate within a given country. In addition, national interest requires that a particular policy or policies be shown to be of service to the society's values.<sup>12</sup> This

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<sup>11</sup>Roy E. Jones, Analysing Foreign Policy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 20.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 21-22.

suggests that a nation's national interest evolves as the nation's history and culture evolve and, indeed, the idea of the national interest has evolved as man's political history evolved.

In fact, what we would call the national interest today is a product of the nation-state system born out of the French Revolution. Prior to 1789, state actions were governed by differing sets of priorities and goals. During the Middle Ages, state actions were governed by *dynastic interest* or the desire of each monarch to expand his domain.<sup>13</sup> However, dynastic interest was only effective as a guiding philosophy as long as a given prince controlled a small area and could surround himself with only a few advisors. As a merchant class began to rise, the prince could no longer afford to ignore their desires.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, as more and more groups within the prince's domain began to attach their interests to those of the monarch, dynastic interest became replaced by the "reason of state" (or *raison d'etat*, *ragioni di stato*, *staatsräson*).<sup>15</sup> *Raison d'etat* could best be described as "maintaining in power the practicing government, whether republican or royal, crushing dangerous opposition at home, extending dominion and influence abroad, and enriching the ruling class of the state."<sup>16</sup> However, *Raison d'etat* tended to ignore the increasing importance of the economic relationship between states in the sense that

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<sup>13</sup>Fred A. Sonderman, "The Concept of the National Interest," *Orbis* 21 (Spring 1977): 122.

<sup>14</sup>Charles A. Beard, The Idea of the National Interest (New York: MacMillan, 1934), 23.

<sup>15</sup>Sonderman, 122.

<sup>16</sup>Beard, 14.

nations could benefit from mutual free trade. At the time, nations favored mercantilist trade which advocated protection of the domestic economy through government intervention. As nations began to realize that national economies were effected by foreign economies, and as the influence of popular control and the nation-state system itself began to grow, *raison d'etat* became more closely associated with "public interest" which eventually evolved into the "national interest."<sup>17</sup>

Nevertheless, while national interest is a product of the development of the nation-state system, the concept still encompasses all the qualities of the previous systems.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, as Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane stated, the national interest of a nation could be broken into three "irreducible" interests:

- 1) physical survival of the people, though not necessarily of the state's territory
- 2) liberty or the ability of the inhabitants to freely function under a set of rights defined by law and under a government of their choosing
- 3) economic subsistence or maximizing the economic welfare of the state<sup>19</sup>

In these three interests one can see how national interest derived from the previous systems.

However, even this definition does not encompass all the elements of the concept of national interest. While the development of national interest from dynastic interest and *raison d'etat* illustrates the influence of political institutions, even these institutions do

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<sup>17</sup>Sonderman, 122. See also Beard, 21.

<sup>18</sup>Beard, 14.

<sup>19</sup>Sonderman, 125.

not consume the entire essence of a nation-state, nor all the elements implied by the term *national interest*. In each of these terms, one-half of the concept is the term *nation*. The state may be defined as a "geographically bounded entity governed by a central authority that has the ability to make laws, rules, and decisions, and to enforce those laws, rules, and decisions within its boundaries."<sup>20</sup> Therefore, *state* consists of the *political* institutions governing a particular geographic entity. *Nation*, on the other hand, encompasses the cultural institutions that bind the people of a given geographic entity. Strictly speaking, a *nation* is a grouping of people who consider themselves as being linked to one another in some manner. This could be culturally, ethnically, or linguistically.<sup>21</sup> Understanding the concept of *nation* is essential to an understanding of national interest in that the national interest is determined within the political and cultural context in which the foreign policy is formulated.<sup>22</sup> In addition, it is important to realize that as the culture, history, and traditions of a nation-state evolve, so does its national interest. Or perhaps more likely, national interest remains constant, but the way it is verbalized, or expressed, changes with time. In addition, the national interest remains the

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<sup>20</sup>Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1991), 26.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>22</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 9.

same, despite domestic political change.<sup>23</sup> Even a revolutionary state cannot forget the traditions of its nation.

An understanding of the evolution of national interest as a framework for foreign policy and how national interest is formulated within the political and cultural context of the particular nation-state, forms the foundation for establishing a definition of the concept. Hans J. Morgenthau defined national interest as the absolute minimum that diplomacy must defend at all costs.<sup>24</sup> As such, the foreign policies of nations must "necessarily refer to their survival as minimum requirements. Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations."<sup>25</sup> Therefore, national interest is "that which a state and its people feel to be permanently essential to continued national existence and development."<sup>26</sup>

Russia is no different from any other nation in that its national interest is determined through an internal political debate and is couched in terms of Russian history and culture. However, while the Russian national interest in a given region may seem obvious to a Russian, it may not be so clear to others. Because the Russian national

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<sup>23</sup>Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Principles of International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 35-36.

<sup>24</sup>Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 540-541.

<sup>25</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the US." The American Political Science Review 46 (December 1952): 972.

<sup>26</sup>Lerche, 34.

interest in a given region, in this case East Central Europe, is influenced by Russia culture and history, any understanding of that interest must be based on an appreciation of the Russian place in Europe. This is particularly important given the final demise of the Russian Empire and the fact that Russia's European borders have returned to where they were roughly at the time of Peter the Great. Indeed, for much of the last 300 years the lands to the west of Russia have formed the frontier separating Muscovy from Europe. For example, Ukraine's importance in the history of Russian relations with Europe is signified by the meaning of its name: borderland. The loss of Belarus' and Ukraine have no doubt been a tremendous shock to Russian nationalists,<sup>27</sup> not only because of the separation of the three Eastern Slavic peoples, but also because of the loss of an historic buffer between Russia and Europe.

Nor is this feeling restricted to only the Union Republics. In the period following the revolutions in Eastern Europe, there were those in the Soviet Union seeking to determine "who lost Eastern Europe." Many laid the blame at the feet of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze for not taking a more hard-line approach towards the revolutions of 1989. The argument stemmed not so much from the fact that the Soviet Union "owned" Eastern Europe, but from the belief that the Soviet Union's national security could not be

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<sup>27</sup>The depth of the feeling among Russians at the loss of Belarus' and Ukraine was described by Eduard Volodin, secretary of the Scholarly Council of Problems of Russian Culture and the USSR Academy of Sciences, when he said that it would be a "national tragedy" if the Ukraine and Byelorussia left the Soviet Union. See John B. Dunlop, "Ethnic Russian on Possible Breakup of the USSR," Report on the USSR, 2 March 1991, 16.

guaranteed without its East European buffer.<sup>28</sup> Even two years later, when it was beginning to be accepted that the USSR had neither the military nor economic means to *occupy* Eastern Europe, some in the Soviet Union still viewed Eastern Europe as lying within the Soviet sphere of influence. In this regard a paper prepared by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stated:

Over the past two years...this [European] region has been unjustifiably thrust into the background in the system of our international priorities...[The] active penetration by the West [has led to a] loss of Soviet interests.<sup>29</sup>

The Soviet position on Eastern Europe as a buffer introduces an important factor in Russian history; geography. Indeed, geography was the decisive feature of Russian history. The terrain of the western steppes and central European plain left Russia with no natural frontier and, in fact, these features facilitated both foreign invasion and Russian expansion.<sup>30</sup> One must remember that the plains of Poland served as a highway for invasion by the Teutonic Knights and Poles during the Middle Ages, Napoleon in 1812, and the Germans in 1914 and 1941. Indeed, it could be said that while Russia had no frontier, for centuries it was, in fact, the *European* frontier; fighting the Mongol hordes

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<sup>28</sup>Suzanne Crow, "'Who Lost Eastern Europe?'" Report on the USSR, 12 April 1991, 1.

<sup>29</sup>"New East European Strategy From Moscow" (text), Frankfurt-am-Main *Frankfurter Allgemeine* in German, 7 June 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-121, 24 June 1991): 23.

<sup>30</sup>Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, Robert Conquest ed., (New York: MacGraw Hill, 1974), 10.

that swept westward from China and then submitting to Mongol domination to save the rest of Europe from a similar fate.<sup>31</sup>

At the same time it was this Mongol domination which gave Russia its unique cultural heritage. Situated between Europe and Asia it exhibits characteristics of both continents, yet it defies definition as either European or Asian. In fact, the inhabitants of each continent see Russia as belonging to the other: Europeans see it as *politically* Asian, while Asiatics see it as *culturally* European.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, the astute nineteenth century observer of Russian political and social culture, the Marquis de Custine, wrote that "[Russia represents] a terrible combination of Europe's intelligence and science with Asiatic genius."<sup>33</sup> In 1836, Peter Chaadayev, nineteenth century author who could be classified among those Russian intellectuals called "Westernizers," wrote, "We are neither of the West nor of the East, and we have not the traditions of either."<sup>34</sup> During the same period, the great Russian writer Alexander Pushkin described Russia as never having "anything in common with the rest of Europe...its history requires ideas and formulas that

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>32</sup>Robert G. Wesson, The Russian Dilemma (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 39.

<sup>33</sup>Astolphe Louis Leonard, Marquis de Custine, Journey for Our Time, quoted in Robert Hingley, The Russian Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), 143.

<sup>34</sup>Hingley, 143.



are different from the ideas and formulas deduced...from the history of the Christian West."<sup>35</sup>

Throughout the course of Russian history, the idea that Russia must remain aloof from the rest of Europe has waxed and waned. At times Russia has seemed to have been willing, almost begging for Western ideas and technology. However, this sentiment has only lasted for brief periods in which only enough Western influence was allowed to penetrate the frontier to make limited, pre-determined reforms, but not enough so as to radically alter (or undermine) the existing order. Once the desired change has been achieved, or if Western influence begins to upset the course of events, contact is broken off. As Peter the Great, the first great Westernizer said, "We need Europe for a few decades, and then we must turn our back on it."<sup>36</sup> In this sense, Russia has seen the maintenance of its frontiers as a means of controlling the influx of foreign influence. Indeed, this belief in closely guarding Russia's borders can be found as early as the seventeenth century when Jurij Križanić wrote:

Next to autocracy itself the most valuable of our traditions is the closing of frontiers, i.e. the prohibition to foreigners of facile access to our country, and the prohibitions to our people of wandering outside the borders of the realm without important reason...The heart and soul of this kingdom is the closing of frontiers...<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 143. In a similar vein Diderot is said to have commented to Catherine the Great, "When an idea is transplanted from Europe to Russia, it altogether changes its complexion." See Wesson, 90.

<sup>36</sup>Hingley, 144.

<sup>37</sup>Szamuely, 62. Križanić was, incidentally, a Croat not a Russian. Nevertheless, he is a significant figure in Russian political thought for he was the first to expound the ideas of pan-Slavism.

Throughout Russian history one sees the development of a state which could best be described as a European state and Oriental empire. A state which does not fit conveniently into our orderly division of the world into occident and orient, but displays the characteristics of both. A state which believes it must isolate itself from Europe or at least control outside access. Therefore it is within this context that Russian national interest has developed. Through this national interest one can see the reasoning for Russian expansion in Europe. Indeed, historically Russia has conquered and subdued only contiguous territories. At the same time, Russia has been reluctant to surrender this territory once firmly occupied. It has surrendered some noncontiguous holdings, such as Alaska, but to yield any of its border territories has historically been regarded as a national tragedy.<sup>38</sup>

Russia's national interest finds its roots in a desire to maintain its cultural, political, and social development, but how has this interest been expressed? While maintaining the security of the Russian frontier from both intellectual and military invasion has figured prominently in its history, this has not necessarily been the only expression of Russian national interest. Indeed, thirty years ago the historian Cyril Black wrote that four major themes in foreign policy have been prevalent throughout tsarist *and* Soviet history. Those themes are: the desire for stable frontiers; an assurance of favorable conditions for economic growth; the unification of territories considered to be Russian by virtue of

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<sup>38</sup>Wesson, 10-11.

dynastic, religious, or national claims; and participation in alliance systems and international institutions.<sup>39</sup>

Obviously, the implicit argument here is that Russian foreign policy has essentially remained the same in character under both the tsars and commissars. Indeed, the only difference between the two has been the ideological bend each government gave to its foreign policy. For imperial Russia, foreign policy was colored by a desire to preserve, or even advance, the autocratic form of government, while at brief intervals inserting some pan-Slavism.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, Soviet foreign policy was developed in terms of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Despite these differing ideologies, the basic philosophy of Russian and Soviet foreign policy did not change. Given that culture, history, and tradition influence the national interest and, therefore, foreign policy, can parallels be drawn from the past and applied to the present? Yes they can, although it must be realized that historical situations never parallel the present *exactly*. Nevertheless, past actions by Russia, whether imperial or Soviet, can demonstrate what is important to Russia with regard to the present.

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<sup>39</sup>Cyril E. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives," in Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, ed. Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 6.

<sup>40</sup>It should be noted that pan-Slavism enjoyed a greater following among the *intelligentsia* than it ever had among government officials. However, it did color Russian foreign policy toward Austria-Hungary in the Balkans during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An excellent example of pan-Slavism gone awry is the change in Russian foreign policy orientation from Germany to France in the period 1875-1890. George F. Kennan's book The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) offers an insight into the impact pan-Slavism and members of the *intelligentsia* had on Russian foreign policy during the period.

## **B. THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE UNDER THE TSARS AND COMMISSARS**

In examining the Russian national interest in East Central Europe three important points must be understood. First, it must be recognized that while Black's four themes are characteristic of Russian foreign policy in general, they do not necessarily apply uniformly to all regions. For example, while imperial Russian expansion toward the Dardanelles may be explained in terms of economic development, the same case could not be made for imperial control of large portions of Poland. By the same token, Soviet control of East European economies between 1949 and 1989 was more likely an additional means of dominating the region rather than a means of improving the Soviet economy.<sup>41</sup> At the same time, Russia cannot be said to have any dynastic claims on Czechoslovakia and Hungary, although Russian occupation of most of Poland between 1795 and 1918 might give them some cause, in Russia's view, to claim parts of that country. It is also important to realize Black's themes are not separate, distinct entities, but may overlap. For example, the desire for a stable frontier may lead to the creation of an alliance system to insure the security of the border. Similarly, Russia's desire to either neutralize or occupy Poland proceeds from the belief that Poland is key to Russia's security.

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<sup>41</sup>However, in the immediate post-war period, the Soviets stripped East Central Europe of industrial machinery and sent it to the Soviet Union. Therefore, initially, Soviet economic policy in East Central Europe was geared to benefit the Soviet Union. Yet, over the course of forty years Soviet economic policy in the region was designed to ensure domination of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

Secondly, it must be realized that for the bulk of the period 1800-1991, the states of modern East Central Europe were divided among the major East European imperial powers and did not take on their current shape until after World War II. Poland had been carved up between Austria, Prussia, and Russia during the partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795. It did not become independent until 1918 and after World War II its pre-war borders were moved several hundred miles to the west. Czechoslovakia was part of the Austrian Empire and after the *Ausgleich* in 1867, two of its current three republics, Bohemia and Moravia, were ruled by Austria, while Slovakia was under Hungarian rule. Hungary, of course, was a major partner in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary became independent in 1918 as well, and like Poland, their borders were redrawn to their current positions following World War II. The point to remember, then is that for much of the tsarist era, Russian interests in East Central Europe were in terms of its direct relationship with Austria-Hungary and Prussia (later unified Germany). After World War I, Soviet Russia was forced to deal directly with the independent governments of the new states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, even though its relationship to those nations was still governed by its relationship with the major Western powers. After World War II, the satellite status of Eastern Europe left the foreign policies of those states essentially at the mercy of Soviet interests.

Perhaps the most important factor in determining foreign policy issues during the tsarist and Soviet periods was the extent to which ideology influenced the actions of the imperial and communist governments. However, this is not to suggest that ideology has

always held an important position in Russian foreign policy. Prior to 1789, the fact that the powers of Europe practiced essentially the same form of government, monarchy (whether absolutist or "enlightened"), made the issue of ideology unnecessary. However, as the revolutionary fervor of the French Revolution spread throughout Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century, Russia increasingly came to see the republican ideals of the French Revolution as a threat to its very existence. Between 1815 and 1854, Russia's main policy objective in Europe was to crush revolution, wherever it may occur, and prevent revolution from infecting the Russian people. After the Crimean War, ideology was still an important factor in tsarist foreign policy, although without the reactionary anti-revolutionary tilt of the earlier period.

The issue of ideology blurs the transition in Russian history from the dynastic interest to the national interest. Indeed, if national interest differs from dynastic interest in that national interest must take into consideration many competing interest groups and political, social, and economic interests, then one might argue that Russia has never been governed by a *national* interest, but only by a *dynastic* interest or, more appropriately, *raison d'etat*. For much of the tsarist era this was true, but following the Crimean War, especially after 1875, Russian foreign policy became increasingly influenced by forces outside the tsar's government.<sup>42</sup> In addition, while the Russian Empire and the Soviet

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<sup>42</sup>Kennan's Decline of Bismarck's European Order describes how the foreign policies of Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III toward Germany became influenced by ultranationalists outside the government. In addition, imperial economic policy in Russian Poland was influenced by Russian industrialists. See below page 27.

Union were multinational states, the foreign policies of their respective governments were, to a certain extent, influenced by Russian nationalism. While the Soviet government attempted to replace nationalism with international worker solidarity based on Marx's belief that the struggle of the international proletariat against international capitalism would transcend nationalistic sentiment, Soviet nationality policy within the Union can only be described as promoting Russian nationalism and culture above all others.<sup>43</sup> At the same time, Soviet foreign policy in Europe, while certainly influenced by Marxism-Leninism, was geared toward the preservation of uniquely *Russian* institutions. Therefore, while preservation of the Russian form of government was a significant factor in imperial and Soviet foreign policy, it was not the only consideration.

Given the importance of ideology in the foreign policy of the tsars, one could say that the national interest of the Russian Empire in East Central Europe was to protect the autocratic government by preventing the rise and spread of competing political ideologies regardless of the cost, as well as protecting the unique Russian culture from excessive Western influence. In addition, if the autocratic form of government could be spread to adjacent states, so much the better. Therefore, based on Black's four themes tsarist Russia operationalized its national interest in East Central Europe by arranging the themes in the following order: stable frontiers; alliance systems; dynastic lands; economic gain.

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<sup>43</sup>The primacy of the Russian nation above all others in the Soviet Union is best illustrated by Stalin's toast to the greatness of the Russian people above all and their importance in defeating Nazi-Germany. Much has been written regarding the relationship of the Soviet government to the many nationalities under its rule. A primer and general history of Soviet nationality policy is Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swaboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

The issue of a stable frontier was decided at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. During the course of the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon had created an "independent" Grand Duchy of Warsaw out of Polish lands held by Austria and Prussia. The Duchy had been the jump-off point for the French invasion of Russia in 1812 and Tsar Alexander I believed that a Russian controlled Poland would secure Russia's border. Therefore, the tsar insisted upon and received the creation of a Kingdom of Poland with the Russian tsar as king. The "Congress Kingdom," as new Poland became known, provided a buffer between Austria and Prussia and Russia.

The centerpiece of Russian foreign policy between 1815 and 1854, however, was the creation of the so-called Holy Alliance between Russia and Austria and Prussia. Originally entered into in 1814 to prevent war between the three great East European powers, it lapsed in 1827. By 1830, it appeared the alliance would be necessary to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideals throughout Eastern Europe. It was through its association with the Holy Alliance that Russia became the self-styled "*gendarme* of Europe." By 1830, the anti-monarchy movement spreading through Eastern Europe threatened the existence of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Empires. By the terms of the Holy Alliance, the parties agreed to aid any party threatened by revolt and to come to each others' aid if threatened by an outside power while engaged in suppressing a revolt.<sup>44</sup> Twice in 1830, Russia was prepared to intervene militarily in West European

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<sup>44</sup>Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 100-101.



revolution, in France and in Belgium, and might well have had it not been for the Polish Revolution of 1830. Russian troops were required to put down that revolt, which ended in 1831, and the tsar's army was instrumental in squashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1848 and returning stability to the Austrian Empire. At the same time, Russia's willingness to use troops in Hungary and Poland demonstrated the tsar's fear that revolutionary ideals might spread into Russia proper.

While Russia may have seen the need to use force to put down East European rebellion in the 1830s and 1840s as necessary to preserve its political and social institutions, neither France nor Great Britain saw Russian actions as defensive in nature. To the two great West European powers, Russia's reactionary policies only served to vividly illustrate what Custine had written in 1839:

[Russia wishes] to rule the world by conquest; they mean to seize by armed force the countries accessible to them, and thence to oppress the rest of the world by terror. The extension of power they dream of is in no way either intelligent or moral; and if God grants it to them, it will be for the woe of the world.<sup>45</sup>

The mistrust of Russian designs and fear of Russian power led to the Crimean War in 1854.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Astolphe Louis Leonard, Marquis de Custine, Custine's Eternal Russia: A New Edition of Journey for Our Time, translated and edited by Phyllis Penn Kohler (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), 145.

<sup>46</sup> The desire to check and even destroy Russian power in Europe was essentially the British reason for going to war in 1854. France, on the other hand, went to war with Russia in a conscious desire to destroy the existing European state system which had kept France in a state of diplomatic isolation since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Norman Rich's book Why the Crimean War?: A Cautionary Tale (London: University Press of New England, 1985) discusses in detail the origins of a war Rich argues should never have been fought.

However, the war illustrated to both the French and British, as well as to Russia that the tsar's empire was nowhere near as powerful as it seemed. Russia's concentration on ideological themes and external threats had left its internal structure to stagnate. Behind the mask of military might lay a backward economy, wretched communications system, and a people still tied to serfdom.<sup>47</sup> Following its defeat in 1856, Russia retreated from an active role in European politics to concentrate on internal reform. Therefore, while maintaining the autocracy was the prime interest, it was achieved through limited political and social reform and limited contacts with the West.

It is interesting to note that while economic backwardness was a key factor in Russia's defeat in the Crimea, it did little to enhance its economic well-being through its Polish territories. The Congress Kingdom's share of the Russian Empire's wealth grew rapidly and, in fact, Poland industrialized much earlier than central Russia. Indeed, Congress Poland's Dabrowa Basin was the principle industrial concentration in the Russian Empire until Russian industrialization began in the 1880s.<sup>48</sup> However, the success of Polish industry caused Russian manufacturers to put pressure on the government to find a means of stifling Polish competition.

Unfortunately for the Poles, their industry was heavily dependent on foreign, particularly German, raw materials as well as foreign markets for its goods. The imperial

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<sup>47</sup>Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 316.

<sup>48</sup>Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. 2, 1795 to Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 107, 170.

Russian government, in order to force Polish dependence on Russian raw materials and Russian markets, placed prohibitively high tariffs on Polish raw material imports and exports of finished goods to Germany. As a result of these protectionist policies, by 1890 seventy percent of Russian Poland's trade was with Russia.<sup>49</sup>

As a general rule, East Central Europe played a small role in Russian foreign policy between the end of the Crimean War and the beginning of World War I in 1914. On the whole that portion of Europe served as a buffer, or more appropriately a holding area, against the increasing power of a unified German state and Russia's traditional rival Austria-Hungary, while Russia turned its attentions toward the Balkans.

It was the conflicts between the three East European empires, particularly Russia and Austria-Hungary, which led to the great European conflagration of 1914-1918, an event which the Russian Empire did not survive. In the wake of its demise, its successor, the Soviet Union, was forced by necessity of internal destruction and civil war to withdraw within itself -- to stabilize the Soviet house. As an international pariah in the interwar period, Soviet Russia was not trusted by the other powers. However, it was slowly able to re-enter European politics.

Upon re-entry into the arena of European politics it became evident that there was little difference between tsarist and Soviet motivations in foreign policy. While the goals may have remained the same, the ideological framework had dramatically changed from

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 170. See also H.J. Habbakuk and M. Postan, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. 6, The Industrial Revolution and After: Incomes, Population, and Technological Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 834-835.

conservative reactionary authoritarianism to leftist radical communism. However, the importance ideology would play early on in foreign policy was based on the belief that communist revolutions were on the verge of erupting throughout the rest of Europe. This is evident in the formation of the Communist International (Comintern) which silently worked for the overthrow of the very governments official Moscow dealt with on a daily basis. As Leon Trotsky's theory of "continuous revolution" gave way to Joseph Stalin's "socialism in one country," Soviet foreign policy toward Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland adapted. This is not to say that ideology did not play a role in Soviet foreign policy, for certainly it did, only that ideology with regard to East Central Europe was aimed at installing "friendly" (i.e., carbon copies of the Soviet government) in neighboring states in order to prevent the infection of the Soviet people by Western ideals. In fact, Article 28 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution indicates that while the Soviet Union would advance socialism in some quarters of the world, it was equally, if not more, dedicated to maintaining the existing political order within its own borders.<sup>50</sup>

Given Stalin's acceptance of the fact that communist revolutions were not going to occur in Western Europe as quickly as the early Bolsheviks had believed, his foreign policy in Europe was aimed at protecting the gains of the 1917 revolution. This was to

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<sup>50</sup> Article 28 stated, "The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favorable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems." Quoted in Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," Problems of Communism 29 (May-June 1980): 3.

be achieved through establishing a buffer between the Soviet Union and the rest of Europe. As with tsarist Russia's aim of protecting its autocratic form of government, Soviet Russia operationalized its national interest by arranging the four themes in the same order: stable frontiers; alliance systems; dynastic lands; and economic gains.

In the early 1930s the issue of a stable western border became a serious issue as a resurgent Germany appeared to be the future threat to Soviet Russia. As early as 1932, the USSR signed numerous non-aggression treaties with its neighbors. By 1934, Soviet Russia was seeking to expand these arrangements into an "Eastern Pact" in which the security of Eastern Europe would be guaranteed by the USSR, France, and Germany. The Soviet attempt failed, principally because Germany and Poland declined the offer. In the end, in 1935, the Soviets opted for alliance with France closely followed by a separate alliance with Czechoslovakia.<sup>51</sup>

The events of the late 1930s also offered the Soviet Union the opportunity to recover territory in Eastern Europe formerly held by the Russian Empire. Stalin may have

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<sup>51</sup>By the terms of these alliances, Russia agreed to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if attacked by Germany, but only if *France* acted first. Of course, if one views a map of the period one will see that the only way Red Army troops could get to Czechoslovakia was through Poland or Romania -- a route both countries refused to approve. Therefore when France did nothing in response to Nazi-Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland in August of 1938, Russia was under no obligation whatsoever to act. In fact, as early as June 1938, Maxim Litvinov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated that "[t]he Soviet Union had nothing to do with [Czechoslovakia's] creation, taking no part in the struggle of imperialist interests [i.e., World War I]." Litvinov went on to say that Germany was merely taking steps to regain its pre-war borders and regain her rights taken away at Versailles. Later, Stalin was able to say, with an element of truth, that he had been willing to act in defense of Czechoslovakia if only France had maintained her treaty obligations. See Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 154.

possessed the foresight in 1934 to see a rising Nazi threat and may have hoped the Western European powers would oppose Hitler. In hindsight it seems he was right and that after 1939 it was fairly clear that neither Britain nor France would do anything to interfere with German expansion. Yet, as the Czech crisis of the fall of 1938 gave way to the Polish crisis of 1939, it appeared the West might finally oppose Hitler. Stalin gambled on this fact and hoped to stall German advances in the East until the Soviet Union could be fully armed. By then, Stalin hoped, Germany would be weakened by its war with England and France and thus allow the Soviet Union to enter the war in time to finish off Germany. The resulting non-aggression pact, signed only days before Germany invaded Poland, was certainly an Unholy Alliance, but Stalin hoped to hold off Germany for a time, as well as to receive substantial territory in Eastern Europe.<sup>52</sup> As a result of the Secret Protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Red Army troops entered eastern Poland in late September 1939. Within the year the Soviet Union had occupied and annexed the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as Bessarabia. Incorporation of these territories gave the Soviet Union a substantial buffer in the event of war with Germany.

As Stalin had hoped, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact only prolonged the inevitable. However, it was not Stalin, but Hitler that struck the first blow. The June

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<sup>52</sup>See George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1961; New York: Mentor, 1962), 307-308. Also Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73, 2d ed (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 270-276. Also Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power, trans. Phyllis B. Carlos (New York: Summit Books, 1986), 322-342.

1941, German invasion forced Soviet Russia into a marriage of convenience with its British and, later, American allies. Never fully trusting either Western ally, the Soviet Union concluded the war with the idea of guaranteeing its own future security in the post-war world. This security was linked to two objectives: a divided Germany and Soviet domination of East Central Europe.

In the grand scheme of Soviet foreign policy in Europe, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, in addition to East Germany, were the strategic keys. These were the countries which straddled the central European plain, the traditional highway into Russia. Given the Soviet desire to prevent their own citizens from being infected by Western political and social culture, it was imperative that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland be subdued and ruled by governments modeled after the Soviet Union.

In maintaining its hold on East Central Europe it is easy to see how the four themes were put to use. In maintaining a stable frontier, East Central Europe was not allowed to deviate from the Moscow-directed governing position to the same extent as Romania and Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, Tito was allowed to pursue "national communism" (and in fact was ejected from the Cominform), while the Romanians were allowed to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy because they were not strategically important to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Soviet troops were used in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and nearly in Poland in 1956 and 1980 when each of these nations attempted to deviate from Moscow's political direction. The Soviet Union was

willing to use troops in these instances because Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were considered vital to the Soviet national interest.

Similarly, the Soviet Union created two international organizations to aid in controlling Eastern Europe as a whole: the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The WTO was created in 1955 in response to Western rearmament of the new Federal Republic of Germany and its entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, unlike NATO, the WTO was probably never meant to be a true military alliance. More than anything it guaranteed the survival of the satellite communist regimes forced upon the East European states by stationing Red Army troops in each state under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>53</sup>

Just as the WTO was created in response to NATO, the CMEA was established in 1949 as an alternative to the Marshall Plan submitted by the United States as a means of rebuilding war-torn Europe. By its charter, CMEA was supposed to coordinate the economies of its members, as well as loans and economic aid. However, in reality it was merely a means for Soviet exploitation of its East European satellites and reflected the political division of Europe.<sup>54</sup> While CMEA did enhance Soviet control over the East European economies, this control was not maintained without its costs.<sup>55</sup> At best CMEA

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<sup>53</sup>Ulam, 577. This is also the thesis of Christopher D. Jones in his book Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981).

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 436-437.

<sup>55</sup>Paul Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," in Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, ed. Sarah Meikelfohn Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 159.



was nothing more than a clearing house for second rate East European goods in return for cheap Soviet raw materials.<sup>56</sup> On the other hand, while Eastern Europe benefitted from large net exports of overpriced manufactured goods to the Soviet Union in exchange for low cost energy and resources, this arrangement helped to preserve their excessively energy-intensive industries.<sup>57</sup> CMEA in effect inextricably tied the economies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to that of the Soviet Union.

In comparing the foreign policies of tsarist and Soviet Russia it is evident that the Russian national interest in East Central Europe has not changed nor has the form in which foreign policy objectives have been achieved drastically altered over time. What does the future hold now that the Soviet Union has dissolved? That is the question to be answered next.

### **C. THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER**

In the wake of the demise of communism in the former Soviet Union it might seem that the national interest of Russia would change, but this is not the case. The national interest of the Russian state did not change with the death of tsarism and the rise of the Soviet state and there is no reason to suspect the new government will alter that interest. Indeed in May 1991, the Soviet foreign ministry expressed the national interest as:

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<sup>56</sup>For example, Hungarian economists estimate that in 1984 Hungary paid as much as 60 percent *below* world market price for Soviet oil. John M. Kramer, "Eastern Europe and the 'Energy Shock' of 1990-91," Problems of Communism 40 (May-June 1991): 86.

<sup>57</sup>Paul Marer, "Foreign Economic Liberalization in Hungary and Poland," American Economic Review 81 (May 1991): 329.

[T]he formation of a truly democratic society based on civil law in which the political, social, economic, and spiritual interests and rights of all its members will be safeguarded by the utilization of the material benefits possible in the present stage of civilization.<sup>58</sup>

Even though the entity for which this interest was expressed no longer exists, it is still an accurate assessment of the position in which Russia finds itself.

Undoubtedly the most severe issue in Russia today is the establishment of new political and economic institutions and internal stability. Whether those new institutions will be democratic (in the American understanding of the concept) is beyond the scope of this study, but what is certain is those institutions must be established within the political and social culture of Russia. In order for new institutions to be established and reforms to take place, Russia must feel secure within its borders and believe that reform can take place without external interference.<sup>59</sup>

In addition, Russia must accept some foreign economic assistance in revitalizing its sagging economy. There is no doubt that a successful economy aids in internal stability. At the same time Russia may need to explore foreign markets for its goods and seek to build or improve economic trade relations abroad.

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<sup>58</sup>Suzanne Crow, "The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Assesses Its Course," Report on the USSR, 17 May 1991, 8.

<sup>59</sup>In an article in the Spring 1992 issue of Foreign Affairs, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote that the "'supertask' of Russian diplomacy in all areas is to make the utmost, concrete contribution to the improvement of everyday life of Russian citizens." He went on to say that "[a]s far as Russia is concerned, we see our goals...in terms of releasing as many resources as possible and creating the utmost favorable conditions for the *implementation of our socioeconomic reforms*." See Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," Foreign Affairs 71 (Spring 1992): 10, 13. (Italics supplied.)

In an era of reform, East Central Europe serves to form a bridge between Russia and Western Europe. In this regard, the Russian national interest remains one of maintaining conditions in the region which will allow for successful political and economic development. The question, then, is how will Russia achieve these goals? In a July 1991, interview, Andrei V. Fedorov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the RSFSR stated,

[T]he most important feature of Russian foreign policy, if it can be expressed in one word, is pragmatism in order to stabilize internal life. This includes the idea that foreign policy should play a very important role in ensuring foreign economic assistance.<sup>60</sup>

With regard to East Central Europe this statement can be operationalized in this order: economic gain; stable frontiers; alliance systems; and dynastic lands.

This order represents a change in emphasis over the tsarist and Soviet periods, but also recognizes that in the post-Cold War period economic ability may be more important than military capability.<sup>61</sup> This may be particularly true for Russian foreign policy in East Central Europe. Economic policy offers Russia two options in its use in that region: as

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<sup>60</sup> Andrei Allakhverdov, "Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Interviewed" (text), Moscow Radio Rossi Network in Russian, 1250 GMT, 3 July 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-130, 8 July 1991): 81.

<sup>61</sup> Indeed, even those opposed to Russian President Boris Yeltsin recognize the importance of restoring the Russian economy. The only real bone of contention seems to be disagreement over the pace of reform. The importance of foreign economic relations is also recognized by Yeltsin's opposition. In February 1992, Chairman of the Russian Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov stated that "a major task of Russian foreign policy and diplomacy is to contribute to the efforts to create an efficient and dynamically developing economy." Khasbulatov said this will enable Russia to take "a dignified place commanding respect in the world community." But he also criticized the Yeltsin government, stating this was a "weak point in the foreign policy of the former USSR" and has failed to be "adequately reflected" in Russian foreign policy thus far. Suzanne Crow, "Khasbulatov On Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Daily Report, 27 February 1992.

a legitimate means of rebuilding its own economy; and as a means of applying pressure on the governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In the first place, it is evident that there are still possibilities for trade to take place between the two regions. The forty year economic ties between Russia and East Central Europe through CMEA will not disappear overnight. For the Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, and Poles, Russia represents a large untapped market for goods they cannot trade with the West because of European Community restrictions. At the same time, there are products which Russia desperately needs, especially food, which East Central Europe can provide.

On the other hand, the same forty year CMEA ties which may facilitate trade also pose a hindrance, and in some respects still allow some Russian control over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. This is particularly true of energy resources. As a result of Soviet domination, East Central Europe found itself a virtual slave to cheap Soviet energy; a dependence which discouraged development of energy efficient industry. East Central European dependence was particularly evident in 1989 as Soviet oil production, and related oil exports, began to decline. This in turn led to fears among the East Central European nations of a complete shut off in Soviet oil supplies.

Economic development, however, cannot take place if Russia does not believe its external borders are secure. This is not to say that the WTO will return, but that Russia needs some type of security arrangement with its neighbors. In the arena of grand strategy, the independence of Ukraine would seem to indicate that Russia will want to offset the power of that new nation by concluding some type of agreement with

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. However, this type of agreement may be many years in the future. For the moment the Russian security interest in East Central Europe is to guarantee the immediate stability of its Western frontier.

In sum, the Russian national interest in East Central Europe in the immediate post-Cold War era is not that different from that of its tsarist or Soviet predecessors. Indeed, Russia has always seen a need to protect its cultural and political institutions from excessive Western influence, except in times of internal reform. As Russia begins to rebuild its socio-political system its foreign policy in East Central Europe must be aimed at allowing the successful completion of those reforms. These conditions can be fostered primarily through economic relations, but also require the belief on Russia's part that its internal affairs will be free from outside interference. Indeed, external security forms the *foundation for continued domestic reform*. Without the *guarantee of stable, secure frontiers*, Russia will be forced to abandon internal reform to face an external threat. How Russia adequately guards against external threats is one of the key aims of Russia foreign policy in East Central Europe in the post-Cold War era.

### **III RUSSIAN SECURITY AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER**

**We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves  
and remain strong. -- George C. Marshall**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In March 1814, the victorious Allied armies entered Paris bringing an end, or so it seemed, to nearly twenty-five years of war. At the head of this army was not Kaiser Franz of Austria, the constant enemy of France during the period, nor was it King George III of England, whose armies had been the most successful in battle against the French. Instead, at the head of the victorious column was Tsar Alexander I of Russia. His was the largest army on the continent; his was the largest nation of all the great European powers. These two factors alone catapulted the Russian Empire to a position of preeminence in European relations. For the next forty years Alexander, and his successor Nicholas I, would be the power to be reckoned with in the east.

At the end of that period, following a disastrous war, it was apparent Russia was not as strong as it had seemed. Russia was so successful in its diplomatic ventures simply because the other powers were awed by the size of its landmass and of its army. When war finally erupted between Russia and France and Great Britain in 1854, the truth became known. Rotten from the inside, Russia's mask of strength was torn away to reveal its real weakness. Overextended by expansion along its eastern frontier and its

efforts to exert influence in Eastern Europe, Russian military might collapsed in a war with modern industrial opponents.<sup>62</sup>

Following its defeat in the Crimean War, Russia retreated from European politics in order to concentrate on internal reform. For almost twenty years Russia did not take an active, aggressive role in European politics.<sup>63</sup> A seriously weakened Russia was forced to turn to collective security to secure its position in the European balance. This is not to say Russia had abstained from alliances in the past. Indeed, it had relied on such combinations quite frequently since the mid-eighteenth century, particularly in time of war, but now it seems Russia's security could only be guaranteed through allying itself with other states against its new rival in the East -- Germany. Indeed, the longest alliance, the Franco-Russian Alliance (1892) would expand into the fateful Triple Entente. It can be said that this single combination ultimately led to the downfall of the Russian Empire in the blood and fire of the Great War.

In 1945, the rejuvenated empire, in the form of the Soviet Union, found itself in a similar position as its tsarist predecessor in 1814. Victorious Soviet armies entered Berlin and found their military might unequalled in Europe. As a result of this power, the newly independent Eastern European states, once the holdings of nineteenth century empires,

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<sup>62</sup>Jelavich, 111-112.

<sup>63</sup>Indeed, between 1856 and 1876 the map of Europe and the balance of power were radically altered. During the period the following key events occurred: in 1859 Italy was united; in 1866 the Austro-Prussian War (Seven Weeks' War) left Prussia the dominant Germanic state; in 1867, a weakened Austrian Empire was forced to restructure its government becoming the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) secured a unified Germany's position as the most powerful nation on the continent.

found themselves subservient to Soviet interests. After a series of provocative moves on the part of the Soviets, the victorious Western allies saw no choice but to form an alliance (NATO) against spreading Soviet power and then rearm their portion of Germany. The Soviets, seeking to ensure their own security and power, formed a similar pact among its East European holdings. The resulting security arrangements kept the peace in Europe for thirty-five years.

But almost as if it were a replay of tsarist Russia, the Soviet state was not nearly as strong as it seemed. Eroded from the inside by an inefficient economy and strained by the necessity to maintain its East European colonies by force, Soviet Russia found itself weakened and facing retreat in European politics.

In post-Cold War Europe Russia is again faced with the necessity to undertake comprehensive internal reform. However, the success of those reforms depends largely on Russia's perception of external threats. Russia's perceptions of those threats, as well as the perceptions of East Central Europe, will determine the nature of their security needs. For Russia, however, there is also the added pressure of maintaining its position as a major European power and avoiding sinking into the status of a "junior partner" with Western Europe. This chapter examines the future Russian security requirements in East Central Europe and possible security arrangements it may achieve with its former Warsaw Pact satellites.



## **B. BALANCE OF POWER AND ALLIANCES DEFINED**

One of Russia's concerns in establishing its place in the new Europe is maintaining its status as a great power. With the break up of the Soviet Union and Russia's rapid retreat from European politics, there are those in Russia who are afraid the West will take advantage of Russia's preoccupation with internal difficulties. In answering these fears, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated in a March 1992, interview:

I do not think we will lose out by comparison with [the West] and end up the part of some kind of weak or junior partner. So I always act on the assumption that Russia is fated to be a great power by virtue of the size of its territory and its labor and other resources.<sup>64</sup>

Given this statement it is evident Russia is concerned with its place in the European system of states. An important factor in determining Russia's place in the European system is the distribution of power within the system.

There have been many attempts at proving whether or not a so-called balance of power exists in the world. It cannot be measured, nor is it necessarily visible, but there is a natural tendency for the nations of the world to gravitate toward a more or less equal distribution of power. Such activity on the part of the nations of the world is largely based on perceptions, not necessarily the most accurate judgement of power, but certainly the most important. Perceptions are important because the balance of power arises as a result of the aspirations of the members of the state system. Because each state is seeking

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<sup>64</sup>Vladimir Tsvetov and Tatyana Krasnova, "Kozyrev Interviewed on Foreign Policy Issues" (excerpts), Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian, 1855 GMT, 3 March 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-043, 4 March 1991): 31.

to increase its power at the expense of another state or states, the perceptions of other states within that system lead to policies aimed at maintaining the status quo. In this regard the balance of power is nothing more than a logical extension of the equilibrium naturally desired by all societies. All social systems, be they national or international, desire stability and strive to maintain that stability within their system.<sup>65</sup>

However, if the social order is to be maintained, one must make certain assumptions. First, it must be assumed that the elements to be balanced are necessary to society or are entitled to exist. Second, it must also be assumed that without a state of equilibrium among them, one element will gain ascendancy over the others, encroach upon their interests and rights, and may ultimately destroy them.<sup>66</sup> In other words, if we are to understand the balance of power we must accept the proposition that without some state of equilibrium the social system will be destroyed by the elements of the system.

These assumptions lead directly to a discussion of the elements of the European balance of power. Such a condition has existed since at least the mid-eighteenth century and is key to our understanding of past and future Russian participation within the European state system. While Russia, like any other European state, seeks to increase its power within the context of the system, it is equally aware that its security is directly linked to the system's maintenance. If Russia is forced to act within the limits of a clearly defined structure, one must understand the elements which perpetuate a balance

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<sup>65</sup>Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 167.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 167.

of power: a state system; a framework; homogeneity; and a rational means of estimating power. These were the elements present during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the era of Metternich and Bismarck and *realpolitik*, but it seems evident these elements continue to this day.<sup>67</sup> Each is directly linked to Morgenthau's assumptions concerning the balance of power.

The elements of the European balance of power are quite easily understood. The balance of power cannot exist without a system of states, each recognizing the concepts of "sovereignty, independence, nationalism, and legal equality."<sup>68</sup> Obviously, without a grouping of interacting states competing for power, there would be no need for a balance. Within the context of the state system, there is also a framework, the recognition that there are a specific number of actors within the system, each with a specific territorial boundary. The element of homogeneity does not refer necessarily to a common culture, but to a common view of international law and strategy. In the European system this common frame of reference is an important element in the ability of states to measure relative power among the members of the system. In addition, if states are competing for power, there must be a rational means of estimating power. Indeed, this may be the most important of the elements since it is by definition the operative term in balancing power. In order to balance power among nations there must be some means for nations to

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<sup>67</sup>Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1955), 3-29.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

measure their relative power among each other.<sup>69</sup> The problem, of course, rests not in how to go about measuring power, but in assigning values to those measures. Here, one runs into the problem of perceptions. For example, how one state defines military power may be the same as another state (e.g., number of division in a given army), but how each state evaluates the quality of that measure may be quite different.

An understanding of the elements of the European balance of power leads to a discussion of its aims. There are only three, but they are ranked in ascending order. One cannot exist without realizing the previous aim. These clearly illustrate the reason for maintaining a balance of power. If these aims are not achieved, the European system will be destroyed. The first aim is to preserve the independence and survival of the individual elements (i.e., states). This aim is basic to the realization of the second: preservation of the state system. Indeed, the survival of individual states is best preserved within the context of the state system. And finally, if the survival of individual states and the state system is to be achieved, then it is critical that no one state should preponderate.<sup>70</sup> In other words, if the system is to survive, then it is essential that no one element should overpower all the others.

If maintaining the balance of power is necessary to the existence of the European system, then how is the balance maintained? There are several methods, but for the purposes of this study only alliances are considered as a means of maintaining the

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 8-29.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 30-34.

balance.<sup>71</sup> Historically, this has been the most important means of maintaining the balance of power. By this method, nations seek to augment their power by joining with other nations. Alliances are not entered into freely, however, since a nation will only enter into such an arrangement if the benefits to be gained outweigh the costs of entering the alliance.<sup>72</sup>

Within the context of alliances it is important to distinguish between its types: general and limited. These are important because of the necessity of understanding the context in which a particular alliance treaty is concluded. *General* alliances are usually concluded during war and for a limited period of time (i.e., the end of the war). Each party to a general alliance is only concerned with winning the war and concluding a favorable peace settlement. *Limited* alliances, on the other hand, are normally concluded during peacetime and encompass only a portion of the interests of the parties.<sup>73</sup>

Having discussed the concepts behind the balance of power it is much easier to see how Russian foreign policy in Europe has been conducted. Russia's past security has been tied to the maintenance of the delicate balance and its position in it, while at the

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<sup>71</sup>Other methods of maintaining the balance of power include: divide and rule; compensation; and armaments. A discussion of these forms can be found in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 178-181.

<sup>72</sup>Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 181. Generally, the costs involved are measured in terms of how much of its sovereignty a nation is willing to surrender. In entering into an alliance in which a state agrees to come to the other party's aid in the event it is attacked, the state gives up some of its ability to decide for itself whether or not to go to war. Loss of sovereignty, as will be seen, was the key factor in the decision by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland *not* to sign bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1991.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 185.

same time it has been forced to operate within the confines of that system. With the break up of the Soviet Union and the reshaping of Europe, the balance of power is also being reshaped. But even though the balance of power in Europe is shifting, the interests of Russia will remain the same. One of those eternal interests is the security of its borders. In these trying times for the Russian state, the security of those borders will be more important than before; important in the sense that Russia must feel free from external interference while it corrects its myriad internal problems.

### **C. THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER, WESTERN EUROPE, AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE**

A major question for Russia in its relations with other European states in the immediate post-Cold War era is how it will achieve external security in order to maintain internal stability. Obviously its security is tied to that of Europe as a whole, but the difficulty here is that generally Europeans are uncertain of what their security needs will be in the post-Cold War era. An important factor in maintaining the balance of power and security in a given region is the existence of a framework for nations to operate within. In this context each nation knows its position and its relationship to other nations within the system. But what happens when the system under which a group of nations has been operating has been destroyed? That is the situation Europe finds itself in today.

The rapid decline of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the resulting breakup of the WTO destroyed the European balance of power system in existence since the end of World War II. These events, coupled with the rising power of a new unified Germany,

the breakup of the Soviet Union, and French attempts to take the place of American power on the continent, have pushed Europe into a period in which a new system is struggling to emerge. In this period, whose duration one can only guess, the key issues will be where each nation fits into the system and how each nation will maintain its security within that system.

While these issues are difficult for any nation to resolve, they are particularly troublesome for Russia and the East Central European nations. Not only must they carve their niche in the international community, but they must do so while conducting a complete overhaul of their political, economic, and social systems. For Russia there is the added complication of trying to act within the international community while still attempting to define its own national character. However, Russia still must remain within the European family of nations if it is to conduct any meaningful internal reform. Nevertheless, despite these difficulties and complications a new European order will be forged and both Russia and East Central Europe will have to participate and function within that system.

The keys to Russian participation in the New European Order are the nations of East Central Europe. Unfortunately for Russia, it is unable to control Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish actions to the extent it was able to prior to 1989. All three of the East Central European states have made it quite clear they want to become part of the West, politically as well as economically. However, they also realize their security and economic development are, to a certain extent, tied to the East and Russia. Indeed, the

nations of East Central Europe see the greatest threat to their security as coming from the East -- not from hordes of motorized infantry and armor of the Red Army, but from streams of refugees and the political and economic instability in the former Soviet Union from which they are fleeing. The sentiment of East Central Europe was expressed by Polish President Lech Walesa when he said the greatest danger to Polish security came from the economic situation, local conflicts in neighboring countries, and a "wave of migrants from the East, which may destabilize the country."<sup>74</sup>

At the same time, the countries of East Central Europe see the same threat to Western Europe and believe they have an important part to play in achieving greater European security.<sup>75</sup> However, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland find themselves increasingly frustrated by what they see as Western Europe's inability to grasp the significance of the

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<sup>74</sup>"Walesa Believes Army Should Be Part of NATO" (text), Warsaw PAP in English, 1129 GMT, 28 February 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-041, 2 March 1992): 21-22. Walesa's beliefs seem to be shared by the Polish people as well. An opinion poll conducted by "the sociological centre (sic) in Sopot, northern Poland" on 26 January 1992 revealed 38 percent of the respondents stated they believed Ukraine was the greatest threat to Poland, while 28 percent named Germany and 16 percent said Russia was the greatest threat. Forty percent said they believed the dissolution of the Soviet Union was bad for Poland, and 62 percent said they felt there was a greater possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by the republics of the former Soviet Union now than before. See "Ukraine Seen as 'Most Dangerous Neighbor'" (text), Warsaw PAP in English, 1524 GMT, 14 February 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-032, 18 February 1992): 31.

<sup>75</sup>In this regard, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier stated in a February 1992, interview, "[S]ecurity of the West, too, now may depend more than ever before on what is going on in Central and Eastern Europe, and also in Asia." He also said, "If these democracies collapsed and nationalist, military, religious, or other dictators came to power" a new division of the world into prospering democracies and countries impoverished under authoritarian regimes would follow. "Dienstbier Views Changing European Security Needs" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 2053 GMT, 7 February 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-029, 12 February 1992): 10.



new threat.<sup>76</sup> The West, though, is still suffering from the shock of the rapid decline of the Soviet empire. For nearly fifty years European security has been defined by such terms as sovereignty, alliance, interstate negotiation, and strategic deterrence. Now that the threat of Soviet expansion is gone, Western European strategic planners are having a difficult time adjusting to the shadowy, vague threats posed in the new order. Increasingly now it seems that greater European security will be found in such concepts as domestic stability, legitimacy of political institutions, competence of political elites and their ability to guarantee public order, law enforcement, and economic welfare.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, these are the very threats that will become more pervasive as Western Europe moves closer to full economic and political unity.

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland find themselves caught in the middle of the transition between the Cold War system and the new emerging European system. Each of them realizes the current reform process is hanging on a very thin balancing wire and the slightest amount of internal unrest could topple the delicate political, social, and economic system they are building. Because of the slow pace of change in the Western security mentality and the threat posed by political and economic upheaval to the east, the nations of East Central Europe have taken every opportunity to expound the position

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<sup>76</sup>In an April 1992, meeting in Berlin with Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Western European Union Secretary General Willem van Eekelen acknowledged Western security institutions are "very slow" in responding effectively to the changing strategic situation in Europe. Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Poland Seeks Special Relations With WEU," RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 April 1992.

<sup>77</sup>Jan Zielonka, "Europe's Security: A Great Confusion," International Affairs 67 (Winter 1990/91): 128.

they want to occupy in the new European security system. Or, perhaps it is better to say they are very forceful about the position they do *not* want to occupy in the New European Order. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland do not want to be a buffer zone between the republics of the former Soviet Union and Western Europe, a position they occupied during the interwar period, nor do they want, quite understandably, to return to Russian domination.

Perhaps the greatest opponents of an East Central European buffer are the Poles. As early as the Visegrad Summit in February 1991,<sup>78</sup> President Walesa argued that East Central Europe should not become a *cordon sanitaire* saying, "We shall not allow a 'sanitary cordon' to be created against anyone."<sup>79</sup> This sentiment was echoed later that month in a foreign policy speech before the *Sejm* by Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski who said, "The main tenet of our security policy is to reject any idea of a 'buffer zone,' a 'gray area,' or neutrality."<sup>80</sup> A year later, Walesa, again expressing his

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<sup>78</sup>The Visegrad Summit was held in Hungary between Walesa, President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, and Hungary's Prime Minister Jozsef Antall. The leaders met to pledge their mutual support to each others' efforts to join Western European institutions. On 15 February, the leaders signed the "Visegrad Declaration" in which they declared their goal was "the total integration [of the three countries] into the [West] European political, economic, security, and legislative order." The Visegrad Declaration also stated their common road to Europe was not meant to disrupt or limit existing relations with any other state (i.e., the USSR). See Jan B. de Weydenthal, "The Visegrad Summit," Report on Eastern Europe, 1 March 1991, 28-29.

<sup>79</sup>Stephen Engelberg, "Three Eastern European Leaders Confer, Gingerly," The New York Times, 17 February 1991, A25.

<sup>80</sup>Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Building a Security System," Report on Eastern Europe, 14 June 1991, 14. A year later Skubiszewski still insisted East Central Europe should not be seen as a buffer zone against instability in the former Soviet Union, but as a "participant in creating new stability and a new balance in Europe." Roman Stefanowski, "Genscher in Warsaw," RFE/RL Daily Report, 5 February 1992.

perception of the threat to Poland of anarchy and large-scale disorder in the former Soviet Union, said that Poland alone would be unable to handle the possible wave of refugees that might result.<sup>81</sup>

While the East Central European nations are united in their opposition to the formation of a buffer zone in their region, until recently there was no common solution as to the best means to ensure their security. In addition, the variety of security options available to them have complicated the decision making process over the past few years. In 1990, the position of each nation on the security issue highlighted the various options: Poland favored self-reliance bordering on non-alignment; Czechoslovakia favored a new pan-European security system derived from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); while Hungary favored increasing ties with NATO and eventually joining that organization. At the same time, while they were looking for a European security organization, the three countries signed bilateral treaties with each other.<sup>82</sup> This gave rise to another option -- an "East Central European Pact." This option, however, has been discounted and, in fact, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have tempered any perceptions that they might be going it alone. They are afraid Western Europe may get the impression that East Central Europe does not want to be integrated into Western

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<sup>81</sup>Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Walesa on Threat of Anarchy in CIS," RFE/RL Daily Report, 26 March 1992.

<sup>82</sup>Vladimir Kusin, "Security Concerns in Central Europe," Report on Eastern Europe, 8 March 1991, 34-35.

European organizations.<sup>83</sup> In this connection, at the Visegrad Summit the leaders of the three countries made it clear they would rather join existing Western European structures rather than create separate political and economic institutions.<sup>84</sup>

However, since 1990, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have arrived, independently, at the conclusion that of the existing European security institutions, only NATO has the structures in place to guarantee the security of the East Central European nations. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier summarized this belief in a November 1991, interview when he said:

...it is in the interest of Europe to stabilize the murky security situations in its midst through an institution that has proved its effectiveness and viability. By no means do we insist that this role be played by NATO. The problem is that no other effective and viable organization exists for this purpose.<sup>85</sup>

At the moment Dienstbier's observation seems to be very true. The performance of CSCE in finding a solution to the Yugoslav civil war has finally demonstrated that CSCE, at least at this stage, is not an adequate conflict resolution body, nor does it have the means to punish those members who deviate from its principles.<sup>86</sup> Indeed, CSCE was

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<sup>83</sup>Celestine Bohlen, "Hungary Resisting Moscow's Shadow," The New York Times, 28 April 1991, A10.

<sup>84</sup>Engelberg, "Three Eastern European Leaders Confer," A25.

<sup>85</sup>"Dienstbier on Role of NATO in Central Europe" (text), Prague Lidove Noviny in Czech, 8 November 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-220, 14 November 1991): 19.

<sup>86</sup>The "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" states the principles of CSCE as promoting free-market economics, respect for the rule of law, upholding the rights of national minorities, treatment of human rights and fundamental freedoms as "the birthright of all human beings," and the holding of free and fair elections. See Richard Weitz, "The CSCE's New Look," RFE/RL Research Report, 7 February 1992, 28.

not designed as a collective security institution, but rather as a conflict prevention organization. CSCE was intended to help reduce the likelihood of conflict between states by promoting economic cooperation, and confidence- and security-building tasks.<sup>87</sup> However, because of its success in this realm its membership has grown to the point where its procedures make it ineffective in dealing with many crises. The inherent problem is that CSCE resolutions require unanimity and all members have the power to veto any measure. There are now fifty-one members of CSCE,<sup>88</sup> therefore it is easy to see that with so many competing interests on any given issue it is difficult to gain a consensus.

While CSCE membership has grown to such an extent as to be cumbersome, its real fault as a collective security institution lies with the fact that it has no mechanism for effectively dealing with conflict should its preventative methods fail, nor does it have any means of punishing members who deviate from the principles they have promised to uphold. Therefore, as a means of guaranteeing the security of Europe, beyond the promise of individual nations to uphold its principles, CSCE is not adequate for the task.

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<sup>87</sup>Richard Weitz, "The CSCE and the Yugoslav Conflict," RFE/RL Research Report, 31 January 1992, 26.

<sup>88</sup>The members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus', Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan, Vatican, and Yugoslavia.

If CSCE is discounted as a means of guaranteeing European security, the region is left only with the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. Despite earlier statements that WEU was not a security option because it was still trying to determine its European role,<sup>89</sup> the East Central European nations have been increasing contacts with that organization. Indeed, in December 1991, the Political Affairs Committee of the WEU recommended that representatives from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland regularly participate in WEU Council sessions that deal with East Central European security.<sup>90</sup> Of the East Central European states, Hungary has been the strongest advocate of WEU membership. During an official visit to Budapest in February 1992, WEU Secretary General Willem van Eekelen met with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszinszkey to discuss Hungarian desires to establish closer ties with security structures of a future United Europe where the WEU becomes a link between Europe and NATO.<sup>91</sup> At a meeting of the Visegrad Three defense ministers with French Defense Minister Pierre Joxes in May, Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur said that Hungary wants to join the WEU as soon as Hungary becomes an associate member of the European Community (EC).<sup>92</sup> Earlier in the year, at speech in Berlin in March, Hungarian Deputy Defense

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<sup>89</sup>Kusin, "Security Concerns in Central Europe," 37.

<sup>90</sup>"Trilateral Security Ties With WEU Proposed" (text), Budapest *Magyar Hirlap* in Hungarian, 3 December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-237, 10 December 1991): 1.

<sup>91</sup>Alfred Reisch, "WEU Secretary General Visits Hungary," RFE/RL Daily Report, 19 February 1992.

<sup>92</sup>Alfred Reisch, "Visegrad Three Military Meeting," RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 May 1992.

Minister Rudolf Joo appealed to the WEU to help Eastern Europe fend off the security threats posed by the civil war and economic chaos in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union.<sup>93</sup> However, these overtures do not necessarily mean Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland are placing WEU above NATO, but more likely represents an effort to hedge their bets by contacting both security organizations. Of course, this puts the East Central European nations in the middle of the ongoing debate between WEU and NATO over the future of European security,<sup>94</sup> but at this stage Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and

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<sup>93</sup>Edith Oltay, "Hungarian Secretary Asks for WEU Protection," RFE/RL Daily Report, 1 April 1992.

<sup>94</sup>The debate between NATO and the WEU actually involves three areas: which organization can guarantee European security; the establishment of the WEU as the "European pillar" of NATO; and out of area missions. In the early days following the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe, NATO officials ridiculed the effectiveness of the WEU and CSCE as security arrangements. At the time, NATO said that Europe alone was not strong enough to balance Soviet power. As for CSCE, too many members, too many different cultures and desires, as well as every member possessing veto power made it certain nothing would get done. Yet, as early as February 1991, a consensus was forming that the WEU should be the European pillar of NATO. WEU Secretary General van Eekelen argued that the WEU had an advantage over NATO in that the WEU could go where NATO cannot; i.e., the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Indeed, later that year van Eekelen stated, "One of NATO's problems is that today every foreseeable conflict will erupt probably out of NATO's area. Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa might be such places."

The U.S. supports a European organization that can bear more responsibility in European security and can coordinate with NATO. However, the U.S. also argues that a "caucus" approach to the WEU, or the creation of a bloc within a bloc, will split NATO. The U.S. is supported in this view by Britain. In October 1991, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand sent a letter to other European leaders proposing the WEU become the pillar of a joint European defense and security policy. The British immediately challenged this proposal as a threat to NATO and also said that the WEU would lead to reduced U.S. commitment in Europe. Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, on the other hand, said there was "no contradiction" between the WEU and NATO. Kohl may have had British objections in mind when he told the *Bundestag* before he left Bonn for the November 1991, NATO summit in Rome, that NATO, not the WEU, remained "the unrenounceable foundation for a stable security policy in Europe." This sentiment was endorsed at the December 1991, EC meeting in Maastricht where the EC endorsed the WEU, but said it would remain closely tied to NATO. NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner echoed the EC statement shortly thereafter when he said, "It must be acknowledged that two military organizations exist in Europe which, following the spirit of Rome and Maastricht, mutually complement each other."

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, therefore, find themselves at the heart the debate, especially since they are located in a region outside NATO's area of responsibility, but increasingly important to

Poland believe they must make every effort to become a part of some pan-European security entity. Indeed, East Central Europe believes pan-European security is essential to stability within their own region. Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall summed up this feeling in December 1991, when he said, "Expanding the all-European security system, of which NATO and the U.S. military presence in Europe, establishing an equilibrium, are the stable guarantee, is the only way to prevent the region from sinking into further conflicts."<sup>95</sup> However, East Central European efforts to join a security organization are hampered by perceptions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland that NATO is not making every effort to bring the region under NATO's security umbrella.

At the same time, the East Central European nations may not fully understand NATO's reasoning for not accepting them immediately into the organization. Initially, NATO officials were reluctant to extend security guarantees to the east for two reasons. On the one hand, there is the difficulty in handling the minority and nationality disputes

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European security. The debate between the WEU and NATO over future European security has yet to be resolved, but the crisis in Yugoslavia may force a resolution of the issues.

See Richard Weitz, "NATO and the New Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern Europe, 24 May 1991, 33-34; also Francine S. Keifer, "Europe Pushes for new Security Organization," The Christian Science Monitor, 26 February 1991, 6; also William Tuohy, "Dutchman Places Hopes on Europ. Only Alliance," Los Angeles Times, 2 July 1991, H3; also Alan Riding, "Mitterrand Joins Kohl in Proposing a European Army," The New York Times, 17 October 1991, A1; also Ian Murray, "Kohl Says Alliance is Key Element in Defense Strategy," Times (London), 7 November 1991, 14; also Alan Riding, "Europe at Crossroads," The New York Times, 12 December 1991, A1, A8; and Laszlo Mecs, "Woerner on Hungarian Support for WEU, NATO" (excerpt), Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian, 1700 GMT, 13 December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-241, 16 December 1991): 19.

<sup>95</sup>F. Lukyanov, "Hungary's Antall Interviewed on Union Ties" (text), Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, 7 December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-237, 10 December 1991): 9.



within and between all the East European nations. As one NATO diplomat said, "If there's a problem with the Turkish population in Bulgaria or trouble between the Czechs and Slovaks, you think NATO is going to send in the troops to keep the peace? Forget it."<sup>96</sup>

On the other hand, until recently there was still the Soviet Union to consider. In 1989 and 1990, NATO did not want to upset the Soviets by giving them the impression NATO was trying to isolate them from Europe. This was particularly true at a time when NATO was constantly assuring the Soviet Union that the alliance was not a security threat to them.<sup>97</sup> Of course, the significance of East Central European desires to join NATO was not lost on the Soviets. As one commentator said of the region's desire to join NATO:

These statements should be deplored. Even associated membership in NATO of countries sharing borders with the USSR cannot but affect the Soviet defense policy.<sup>98</sup>

NATO's concern over Soviet reactions to any expansion of NATO membership was still evident in June 1991, when NATO offered to strengthen its political and military ties with Eastern Europe. At the time, NATO declared that any "coercion or intimidation" aimed

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<sup>96</sup>Weitz, "NATO and the New Eastern Europe," 33. The civil war in Yugoslavia illustrates the unwillingness of NATO to get caught in the middle of ethnic and religious conflicts in Europe. Although the May 1992, decision by NATO defense ministers to allow NATO forces to be used as peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a significant change in NATO philosophy and perhaps not a little frustration at the inability of any other security organization or nation to conclude a successful peace, the nations of Western Europe are still wary over becoming involved in a situation which for them might become a Vietnam or Lebanon.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., 32.

<sup>98</sup>Albert Balebanov, "European Security After Pact Viewed" (text), Moscow TASS in English, 1007 GMT, 1 April 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-062, 1 April 1991): 7.

at Central or Eastern Europe would be treated as matter of "direct and material concern." However, NATO tempered this statement by stating it was not meant as a challenge to the Soviet Union, but rather to satisfy the security concerns of the former Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states.<sup>99</sup>

There is also, perhaps, a third reason NATO has been slow to extend security guarantees to East Central Europe -- the continuing debate within NATO concerning out of area missions. Although recently "out of area" has become more and more associated with NATO security concerns outside Europe, it must be remembered that, strictly speaking, all of Eastern Europe is outside NATO's area of responsibility. This problem may have led President Bush to rebuff Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's October 1991, plea that Eastern Europe be granted associate membership in NATO. According to Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, associate status would require renegotiation of the NATO treaty and would not be in the interest of NATO or Eastern Europe.<sup>100</sup> At a press briefing, an administration official summed up this sentiment when he said, "NATO extends its security guarantees to members. It doesn't extend them to non-members."<sup>101</sup> However, at the November

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<sup>99</sup>Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO Ties to Ease Security Concerns in Eastern Europe," The New York Times, 7 June 1991, A1.

<sup>100</sup>"Havel Rebuffed on NATO Links," Times (London), 24 October 1991, 14.

<sup>101</sup>Peter Grier, "Eastern Europeans Wary of Neighborhood Conflicts," The Christian Science Monitor, 25 October 1991, 7. Nevertheless, it seems, now, that NATO's concept of "out of area" is out of date. The civil war in Yugoslavia illustrates "out of area" can be close to home and that NATO cannot ignore conflicts outside traditional NATO boundaries. Michael Evans, "Conflict Forces West to Rethink Alliance Strategy," Times (London), 16 January 1992, 7.

1991, NATO summit in Rome Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis said that NATO should give security guarantees to the former Non-Soviet WTO members. De Michelis argued that even if the Eastern European nations cannot be NATO members, NATO should find a way to involve them.<sup>102</sup>

It seems NATO has found a means of including Eastern Europe in the greater European security process through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). This development has been largely due to changes within the Soviet Union, or more appropriately its dissolution. In September 1991, NATO General Secretary Manfred Wörner said he believed this could happen because in the wake of the failed coup attempt hard-line pressure on Eastern Europe, as well as fear of NATO, may disappear.<sup>103</sup> As a result of changing attitudes within the Soviet Union, on 2 October 1991 German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III proposed the establishment of the NACC as a NATO non-defense auxiliary.<sup>104</sup> The council would serve as a forum for officials from NATO, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union<sup>105</sup> to discuss political and military matters.<sup>106</sup> This proposal was welcomed by

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<sup>102</sup>Michael Evans, "NATO Comes to Terms With New Europe," Times (London), 7 November 1991, 14.

<sup>103</sup>Alfred A. Reisch, "New Prospects for Hungarian-Soviet Relations," Report on Eastern Europe, 27 September 1991, 9.

<sup>104</sup>Grier, 7.

<sup>105</sup>With the breakup of the Soviet Union each of the former republics, except Georgia, is a member of the NACC. The NACC consists of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,

the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish foreign ministers in Cracow on 5 October where they stated, "there is a need to create conditions for the direct inclusion of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the activities of the [NATO] alliance."<sup>107</sup> The inaugural meeting of the NACC was held in December 1991, and the foreign ministers first met in March 1992. The new organization promises to improve the political and military ties between NATO and Eastern Europe, but for East Central Europe it is only the beginning of a long, gradual drive toward full integration.

However, NATO still continues to resist attempts by the East Central European states to become full members of the organization. Indeed, in March 1992, NATO Secretary General Wörner said that NATO relations with Eastern Europe are part of a "dynamic process that progresses with time." Wörner also said there is a "possibility" of NATO membership for Eastern Europe.<sup>108</sup> Even though contacts continue at the parliamentary and military levels, this does not satisfy a region which sees itself caught in a power vacuum between the East and the West. Unable to adequately guarantee their security between themselves against the unrest and turmoil to the east, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland feel they must convince the West the region is important to Western security

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Russia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the United States.

<sup>106</sup>Jan de Weydenthal, "The Cracow Summit," Report on Eastern Europe, 25 October 1991, 28.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>108</sup>Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Woerner: East European States Could Join NATO," RFE/RL Daily Report, 10 March 1992.

in order to be included in a Western security organization. However, at the same time they cannot afford to alienate the large neighbor to the east, Russia, who historically has seen East Central Europe as the heart of its security interests in Europe.

#### **D. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIAN SECURITY IN EUROPE**

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland find themselves in an unenviable position; caught between a resurgent Germany and a declining Russia, they are at the center of a power and security vacuum in Central Europe.<sup>109</sup> Because of this vacuum, the East Central European nations realize more than ever that their security can be ensured only through maintaining good relations with both the East and the West.<sup>110</sup> However, just as the East Central European nations reject the formation of any type of buffer zone in the region between Russia and the West, they also reject any resumption of Russian dominance in the region.<sup>111</sup> This possibility and the memory of Soviet occupation under the auspices of the WTO prompted the drive to join NATO, WEU, or any other security organization.

At the same time, however, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have been hampered by the fear of upsetting their large neighbor to the east. Even though troops of the former

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<sup>109</sup>In understanding the region's predicament, Hungarian Prime Minister Antall said, "We would find it detrimental if between a unified Germany and the Soviet Union, there were a so-called security vacuum." See Bohlen, "Hungary resisting Moscow's Shadow," A10.

<sup>110</sup>Jiri Dienstbier, "Central Europe's Security," Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991): 121.

<sup>111</sup>In this regard, on 29 March 1992 Poland's President Walesa told Italian President Francesco Cossiga, on a stop in Warsaw enroute to Moscow, that Eastern Europe "will never accept Russian domination." See Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Walesa Calls for 'Parallel' Alliance," RFE/RL Daily Report, 30 March 1992.

Red Army are being withdrawn and the region is separated from Russia by a newly independent Ukraine, the East Central European nations realize the region is important to Russian security interests in Europe.

The problem for Russia, however, has been how to approach security building with their former satellites. The collapse of the WTO caused many in the Soviet Union to fear for its security. To some, a buffer is still required to separate Russia from a newly unified Germany.<sup>112</sup> But, nearly two years after the reunification of Germany it appears the real threat to Russian security is not German power, but internal instability in Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. A threat of this type requires an entirely different security arrangement than would a politically and economically stable state. For Russia, then, it is important to ensure that no foreign intervention should interrupt the time consuming reform process that it must undergo.

Given the Russian historical view of East Central Europe as either a buffer against the West or a highway of Western influence or invaders, it is important at this stage in Russia's rebirth that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland become a highway for Western technology and aid to build a new Russia. At the same time, the region must remain a buffer against any hostile intervention in Russia. This is not to say there is such a threat, but it is certainly in Russia's interest to guard against even the possibility of foreign intervention. There is no doubt that this was Russia's, or at the time the Soviet Union's,

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<sup>112</sup>Leonid Mlechin, "A New Relationship is Needed" (text). Moscow New Times in English, 20 February 1990. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-90-047, 9 March 1990): 54.

idea when it first approached its former satellites about a new security arrangement. In the period immediately following the demise of the WTO, the Soviet foreign ministry presented each of its former WTO allies with a proposed bilateral agreement, essentially a non-aggression treaty, but with the provision that neither party join "alliances that oppose each other."<sup>113</sup> Almost with one voice the East Central European nations rejected these treaties as infringing upon their sovereignty and in effect "Finlandizing" the region. In rejecting the treaty language Czechoslovak President Havel stated that Czechoslovakia did not want to join any alliance aimed at the Soviet Union, but the treaty language was unacceptable because it restricted Czechoslovakia's freedom of action -- especially since it wanted to join the European Community.<sup>114</sup> Similarly, Hungarian Prime Minister Antall stated Hungary wanted to join whatever group it wished, but Antall also said he thought the Soviet motivation for the treaty language was to set up a security zone in Eastern Europe and to prevent the Soviet Union from being isolated.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup>Jan Petranek, "Pankin on CSFR Treaty, Disarmament" (text), Prague Lidove Noviny in Czech, 4 October 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-198, 11 October 1991): 11.

<sup>114</sup>The significance of the EC reference lies in the fact that many nations already in the EC view that organization as the basis for a future pan-European security arrangement. The spirit, if not the intent, of a treaty such as the one originally proposed by the Soviets would have prevented Czechoslovakia, or any other Eastern European country for that matter, from joining the EC. This might have been very detrimental to East Central Europe since each of the countries sees EC membership as critical to its economic recovery. (See Chapter IV.) "CSFR's Havel Cited on New Treaty With USSR" (text), Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, 1 May 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-084, 1 May 1991): 18.

<sup>115</sup>Bohlen, "Hungary Resisting Moscow's Shadow," A10.

With "Finlandization" rejected by its former satellites, the Soviets continued to negotiate bilateral treaties with them. But once the language concerning alliances was removed, the way was clear for the signing of bilateral treaties between East Central Europe and Russia. On 3 October 1991, then Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier initialled a "Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation."<sup>116</sup> However, the breakup of the Soviet Union prevented the formal signing of the treaty. A new treaty, based on the October 1991, treaty, but of shorter duration (ten years rather than the fifteen originally agreed upon), was initialled on 18 February 1992 and signed by Presidents Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia on 1 April 1992.<sup>117</sup> A similar treaty had been signed by Russia and Hungary in December 1991.<sup>118</sup> As for Poland, a treaty was initialled on 2 December 1991, but was not to be signed because of the breakup of the Soviet Union.<sup>119</sup> Later, President Walesa refused to go to Moscow until an agreement had been reached concerning the withdrawal of former Red Army troops from Poland.

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<sup>116</sup>Jan Obrman, "Treaty Signed with the Soviet Union," Report on Eastern Europe, 1 November 1991, 1.

<sup>117</sup>"'Friendship Treaty' With Russia Outlined" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 2042 GMT, 18 February 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-035, 21 February 1992): 44-45. Also Barbara Koulik, "Havel in Russia," RFE/RL Daily Report, 1 April 1992.

<sup>118</sup>"Russia, Hungary Sign First Interstate Treaty" (text), Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian, 1000 GMT, 6 December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-235, 6 December 1991): 65.

<sup>119</sup>"Makarczyk Hails 'Splendid Treaty' With Russia" (excerpt), Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish, 1105 GMT, 11 December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-239): 23.



However, by March 1992, an agreement had been reached between Russia and Poland and in May Walesa agreed to travel to Moscow where a treaty was signed on 22 May.<sup>120</sup>

However, bilateral agreements could be only the beginning of Russian security arrangements in Europe. While the bilateral treaties satisfy the immediate need to secure their western borders, they do not satisfy the need to find a means of entering the

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<sup>120</sup>The question of the disposition of former Soviet troops on Polish soil has been a major bone of contention between Russia, who claims to control those troops, and Poland. The dispute arose, not only over the timetable for the withdrawal, but also over how many troops have already left and who is financially responsible for them. In January 1992, Russian Ambassador to Poland, Yuriy Kashlev, said, "Nothing can alter the 15 November [1992] deadline for the withdrawal from Poland of all combat troops from the former Soviet Army's Northern Group of Forces." He also claimed 10,000 troops had already departed in 1991. This figure was disputed by the Poles and a spokesman for General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, the Polish official responsible for monitoring former Soviet troops in Poland, said in February 1992, that only 4,387 former Soviet troops had departed Poland between April and September 1991. The spokesman also claimed there were still 45,000 former Soviet troops still stationed in 22 garrisons in Poland. The problem for the Poles is that the Soviets never told them how many troops were stationed in Poland. Nevertheless, on 26 January 1992 the Northern Group of Forces commander, General Viktor Dubrynin, said that all former Soviet units would be out of Poland by the end of 1993. All combat troops will depart by 15 November 1992, but 6,000 transport and signal troops will remain behind to support the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from eastern Germany.

On 16 April 1992 it was announced that an agreement had been reached concerning financial arrangements for the former Soviet troops. Although the terms of the agreement were secret, it was implied that the Poles agreed to finance the transfer and resettlement of former Soviet troops using profits from Polish-Russian joint ventures to be established at the former Soviet facilities in Poland. Later in April Russian First Deputy Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, said that out of the \$400 million expected from the sale of former Soviet military facilities in Poland, one-quarter would go to Poland as compensation for environmental damage, while the rest would be used to construct housing for returning troops. The treaty, however, has not been well received in Poland. Many Poles see Russia taking advantage of Polish desires to get the former Soviet troops off Polish soil whatever the cost. One commentator wrote, "The Russians have managed to negotiate an agreement that allows them to remain in Poland forever." He also claimed there was a chance Poland might become a Russian "half-colony."

See Louisa Vinton, "Confusion Over Soviet Troop Withdrawal," RFE/RL Daily Report, 23 January 1992; also Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Soviet Troops To Leave Poland By End of 1993," RFE/RL Daily Report, 27 January 1992; also Roman Stefanowski, "Troop Withdrawal From Poland Lagging," RFE/RL Daily Report, 21 February 1992; also Roman Stefanowski and Louisa Vinton, "Poles to Help Finance Troop Withdrawal?" RFE/RL Daily Report, 16 April 1992; also Roman Stefanowski, "Progress in Polish-Soviet Military Talks," RFE/RL Daily Report, 22 April 1992; and "Daily Claims Russians Intent on Staying" (text), Warsaw Nowy Swiat in Polish, 21 April 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-083, 29 April 1992): 32.

European family of nations. Shut out of EC, and thus the WEU, for the foreseeable future by its myriad economic woes, and whatever political and military power Russia might have offset in the CSCE by the sheer size of that organization, Russia must find another means of flexing whatever political muscle it may have in Europe. Therefore, of the existing security institutions only NATO is left.

But does Russia really want to be a member of NATO? There are arguments inside Russia on both sides of the issue. The most extreme argument against joining NATO is that it would be the "last step on the road to turning Russia into the bourgeois colonialist bloc's junior partner."<sup>121</sup> Similar claims have been made against the NACC. One commentator wrote:

It is through the Cooperation Council that NATO would like to attract East European countries and all the former Soviet republics to itself (*as second-class partners*), to keep under control all military questions, connected with them and to influence policy.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>121</sup>B. Zanegin, "NATO Entry May Have 'Dangerous Consequences'" (text), Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, 18 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-015, 23 January 1992): 25. Despite its extreme appeal to old-time communists, this statement, and the article in general, does reflect the view among some that NATO represents anti-Russian sentiment. Just as we in the West came to see the WTO as the embodiment of the enemy, so did those in the East view NATO. It is no wonder that there are those who would see Russia's membership in NATO as the ultimate humiliation. However, it is interesting to note that an April 1992, meeting between Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Information Directorate, and Erica Bruce, chief of NATO's Information and Press Administration, paid particular attention to this issue. The meeting stressed the problems of overcoming Cold War thinking and eliminating the vestiges of an enemy image in people's minds and replacing it with the image of partners. "CIS, NATO Military Information Aides Confer" (text), Moscow *Krasnaya Zvezda* in Russian, 11 April 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-075, 17 April 1992): 7.

<sup>122</sup>A. Baryshev, "Former USSR States Seek NATO Membership" (text), Moscow *Sovetskaya Rossiya* in Russian, 18 April 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-079, 23 April 1992): 4. Emphasis added.

The same commentator attacked what he called:

...Washington's plan to expand NATO's sphere of operation through the structure of the Cooperation Council and, by preserving its own leading role in the alliance, to advance the idea of a "pax Americana" into the plane of practical fulfillment in the Eurasian direction with the help of "second class" or associate members of the organization.<sup>123</sup>

Perhaps the most convincing argument against NATO membership, however, came from Aleksei Arbatov in an 11 March 1992 article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta. In the article, Arbatov argues that Russia does not need NATO, nor does NATO need Russia.

On this point he says:

If...it is supposed that the United States or West Europe would guarantee Russia's security, then this...is unrealistic. With its Army of 3 million men with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, Russia faces no serious military threat from outside that it would need the West's help to repulse.<sup>124</sup>

In fact, he argues, if Russia joins NATO, the organization will die because its *raison d'etre* is gone. In other words, Russian membership is incompatible with the aims of NATO.<sup>125</sup>

However, Arbatov's argument misses two important points. First, while he is correct in asserting there is no serious *external* threat to Russia, he discounts the threat posed by economic and political conflict within Russia itself. In addition, he is also correct in

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<sup>123</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>124</sup>Aleksei Arbatov, "NATO Membership Seen as Unlikely Prospect" (text), Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, 11 March 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-048, 11 March 1992): 21.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., 21.

saying that Russian membership in NATO is incompatible with its *raison d'etre* as derived in 1949, but he ignores NATO's realization that the threat it was formed to counter no longer exists and that in order to survive and remain a viable security organization it must alter its mission.

While Russia hesitates to join NATO at this point for its security guarantees, Russia does see an important role for NATO in helping reform many aspects of Russian society. As early as November 1991, members of the Russian parliament acknowledged their interest in seeking agreements with NATO for assistance in converting Russia's military-industrial complex to the civilian sector.<sup>126</sup> Similarly, Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Evgenii Ivanovich Shaposhnikov indicated in February 1992, that he believed the most likely NATO assistance is in the area of military reform "because the armies of the NATO countries already have such features as professional armies, for example, and contract service."<sup>127</sup> Likewise, in March 1992, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated that

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<sup>126</sup>"Government To Seek NATO Membership" (text), Moscow Interfax in English, 2000 GMT, 14 November 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-221, 15 November 1991): 59.

<sup>127</sup>Doug Clarke, "Shaposhnikov On Cooperation With NATO," RFE/RL Daily Report, 25 February 1992. Shaposhnikov made this statement in a 24 February interview prior to the arrival in Moscow of NATO Secretary General Wörner for talks with Commonwealth of Independent States political and military leaders. The following day, Wörner stated that NATO would not get involved in the internal debate over the reshaping of former Soviet armed forces. Stephen Foye, "NATO-CIS Talks," RFE/RL Daily Report, 26 February 1992.

"[w]e consider the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to be another mechanism to help us join the international community."<sup>128</sup>

Given Russia's security needs, however, it does not necessarily need NATO, or any other military organization for that matter, to guarantee its European security. At this point those needs are met by the bilateral agreements signed with the individual East Central European nations. The kind of security guarantees Russia needs more than any other are guarantees that its economic and political reforms will succeed. This can only be accomplished through contacts with all the developed countries, but in Europe particularly through organizations which it has some chance of joining.

#### **E. CONCLUSION**

In 1992, Russia finds itself once again facing a New European Order. As in 1856 and again in 1918, Russia cannot be sure where it will fit in the new order. However, what is certain is that if Russia is to compete in the European system in the future it must withdraw from an active role in European politics for the near term in order to correct its many socio-economic woes. Nevertheless, external security is just as important, if not more so, now than when Russia was a strong European power.

However, the nature of the threat to Russian security has changed. The threat of external invasion has been replaced by a threat from internal unrest and instability. Security from this threat cannot be achieved through military alliances, but through

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<sup>128</sup>Yuriy Sidorov, Valeriy Shashkov, and Georgiy Shmelyov, "Kozyrev On North Atlantic Council Meeting" (text), Moscow TASS in English, 1546 GMT, 10 March 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-048, 11 March 1992): 20.

development of political and economic institutions which meet the basic needs of the citizens of a given nation. Given the changing nature of the threat to Russian security, membership in a larger pan-European security arrangement is not necessary at this stage. Russia's immediate external security concerns can be met through a series of bilateral agreements with each of its former WTO allies and the other European republics of the former Soviet Union.

The task for Russia now is to rebuild its shattered economy so that internal unrest and instability does not grow within Russia and spill over into neighboring states. It is in this realm, more so than external security, that the nations of East Central Europe will play a major role in Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War era.

**IV**  
**REALISM IN THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER:**  
**THE ECONOMICS OF RUSSIAN AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN**  
**RELATIONS AFTER THE WARSAW PACT**

The new god of war was born in the workshops:  
he is Mars-Mechanized. -- B.H. Liddel Hart

**A. INTRODUCTION**

In the heady days following the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the newly emerging governments in the region seemed bent on re-establishing their historic ties with Western Europe. But more important than the cultural ties between the two regions was the simple fact that the nations of Western Europe had the economic resources their Eastern neighbors so desperately needed to rebuild their shattered economies. Given the resentment toward the Soviet Union within East Central Europe, the newly independent nations of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland seemed prepared to turn their collective backs on their former colonial masters and trust their futures to each other and the West. But two years later it now appears that while Western Europe was willing and able to give moral support to emerging capitalism in East Central Europe, it was less willing, for whatever reasons, to provide the type of aid Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest felt they needed. At the same time, the nations of East Central Europe began to realize that in a world of increasing economic interdependence they could not afford to alienate anyone, no matter how they felt about that nation.

The situation in which both the East Central European nations and Russia find themselves, illustrates an important reality in an ever more *interdependent* world -- national security, and the diplomacy aimed at maintaining that security, increasingly involves *economic* security and prosperity. In the previous chapter it was asserted that the East Central European states, as well as Russia, believe the greatest threat to their security is political and economic instability both internally and in surrounding countries. Therefore it is important to realize that in the future national security may increasingly involve national attempts to prevent economic vulnerability due to foreign investment as well as traditional economic preparation for military defense.<sup>129</sup>

In addition, if economics and economic relations are becoming an increasingly important aspect of foreign policy, one must consider the forms of economic statecraft nations may employ. In one instance, weak states may use scarce natural resources to influence the policies of strong and wealthy nations. A second form of economic statecraft is the use of trade and financial assistance by strong states to influence the policy options of weak states. Finally, the most dangerous form of economic statecraft is the use of economic forces and means by strong states against each other; in other words, economic warfare.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>129</sup>Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Changing Relationship between Economics and National Security," Political Science Quarterly 106 (Summer 1991): 272.

<sup>130</sup>*Ibid.*, 272.



Which form of economic statecraft will Russia employ? This chapter will examine the fact that the Soviet Union, through Comecon, is largely responsible for the desperate economic situation the East Central European states find themselves in today and for this they have every right to turn their backs upon the Russians. At the same time, the forty year ties to the Soviet economy still linger and cannot be easily severed. This fact is particularly relevant when one considers that despite associate membership in the European Community, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland will be restricted from certain markets, such as textiles, steel, and agriculture, for five to ten years. The bottom line, then, for East Central Europe is that in spite of whatever animosities they feel toward Russia, their economic future is still heavily dependent on certain aspects of the Russian market; a fact which the leadership of the East Central European nations recognize. On the other hand, the strong economic ties between East Central Europe and Russia provide a means through which Russia can still influence the actions of the East Central European nations. In an era when Soviet troops are withdrawing from Eastern Europe, the heavy reliance East Central European nations place upon Russian natural resources give the Russians a potent foreign policy weapon.

## **B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the headlong rush toward Western Europe was motivated by several factors, including the belief that Western Europe had the financial capital to bring its eastern brothers into the late twentieth

century.<sup>131</sup> In addition to this is the fact that the forty-odd years of Soviet domination forged an artificial barrier between East Central Europe and the West. While Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland are considered "east central" Europe, they are culturally and historically Western. In this connection it is important to remember that all of present day Hungary and Czechoslovakia were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and that Poland was partitioned between Austria, Prussia, and Russia between 1772 and 1795 and remained under these nations' control until 1918. In addition, even though Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks are ethnically Slavic, like their Russian brothers, they are more Western than Eastern. Indeed, the only link between the Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks is their linguistic commonality.<sup>132</sup> In every other aspect they are different. Religiously, the Russians are Orthodox Christian, while the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks are Roman Catholic. In terms of historical and political development, as we have already mentioned, the nations of East Central Europe are tied to the West through the Austrians and Germans. Given these historic ties, as well as the economic development of the

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<sup>131</sup>Western Europe may only have themselves to blame for this. In early 1991, a senior European Community official stated, "Suddenly the West is confronted by its own past rhetoric when it complained, 'How evil the Communists are for not letting their people go.' Easterners would hear the community boasting about its virtues so that's where they want to be -- either through membership or immigration." Quoted in Alan Riding, "At the East-West Crossroads, Western Europe Hesitates." The New York Times, 25 March 1991, A6.

<sup>132</sup>Indeed, pan-Slavism historically is a movement which proclaims an affinity for a variety of peoples living in different political entities, with differing religious, cultural, and historical backgrounds solely on the basis of a common *linguistic* heritage. See Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1953), 1.

West, it is not surprising that the primary aim of the East Central European nations is to "return to Europe."<sup>133</sup>

Perhaps an even greater motivation for seeking to renew ties with Western Europe was the imposition of an alien political and economic system upon the peoples of East Central Europe. Nowhere is this more evident than in the creation of the WTO. Originally created as a counter to NATO, the WTO came to symbolize the continuation of illegitimate regimes which survived only because Red Army troops were stationed on their territory.

Possibly the greatest tragedy of Soviet occupation, however, was the economic system forced upon Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland which, while allowing some growth, largely slowed their economic development in the post-World War II era. Although some of the blame for slow growth lies with the nature of the planned economy itself, the main reason for slow recovery in Eastern Europe as a whole lies with the fact that the Soviets removed much of the industrial machinery from the occupied areas and took it to the Soviet Union.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>133</sup>The sentiment among the East Central European nations was probably best expressed in an August 1990 interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister J<sup>es</sup>zenszky when he stated that Hungary's main aim was to rejoin Europe "to which it belonged to both in the cultural and economic field, until its bonds were severed in 1945." While Poland and Czechoslovakia have not necessarily made similar statements, their actions since 1989 indicate an equal desire to turn westward. See "J<sup>es</sup>zenszky Comments on Foreign Policy Issues" (text), Budapest MTI in English, 1927 GMT, 2 August 1990. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-90-150, 3 August 1990): 24.

<sup>134</sup>Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," 156.

One can understand the extent of the affect of Soviet domination on the economies of East Central Europe by comparing the pre-war economic status of each country with the conditions they find themselves in today. For example, prior to World War II Czechoslovakia found itself the richest of the successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Following the break up of the empire, it found itself with two-thirds of the industry, but only one-fifth the area and one-quarter the population of the old empire. Czechoslovakia's war industry alone was larger than that of Italy. During the 1930's, while its neighbors were frantically trying to industrialize, Czechoslovakia produced half the steel and pig iron in the region.<sup>135</sup> Before World War II, Czechoslovakia's per capita gross national product (GNP) was at the same level as that of Austria and Belgium, its industries were on the cutting edge of technology, and its products were known worldwide.<sup>136</sup> Even after World War II Czechoslovakia had a highly developed industrial base that was not destroyed by the war.<sup>137</sup> Yet, after forty years of Soviet influence, per capita GNP in Czechoslovakia has been reduced to only slightly better than one-fifth that of Austria and Belgium<sup>138</sup> and equivalent to that of Trinidad and Tobago.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>135</sup>Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 86-87.

<sup>136</sup>Karl Dyba and Jan Svejnar, "Czechoslovakia: Recent Economic Developments and Prospects," American Economic Review 81 (May 1990): 185.

<sup>137</sup>Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe." 157.

<sup>138</sup>Dyba and Svejnar, 185.

Of the East Central European successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Hungary fared the worst in the interwar period. As a major combatant in the Great War, Hungary lost territory in the subsequent peace treaty. After the *Ausgleich* in 1867, which split the Austrian Empire in half, Hungary ruled portions of what are now Austria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. In fact, in 1910, Hungarian territory covered over 282,000 square kilometers, but after the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, it was reduced to just under 93,000 square kilometers. The economic impact of such a loss in territory was tremendous. Fifty-eight percent of Hungary's railroad mileage and 60 percent of its road mileage were lost. In natural resources Hungary lost 84 percent of its timber, 43 percent of its arable land, 83 percent of its iron ore, 29 percent of its lignite, and 27 percent of its bituminous coal. However, Hungary was fortunate in that 55.5 percent of the pre-war production value of its industry remained. Nevertheless, Hungary's post-war industrialization lagged and by 1930, it was still a heavily agrarian nation with over half its population engaged in agriculture. In all fairness, Hungary's industrial development was hampered by the Great Depression. In 1929, the ratio of wage earners to dependents was 100:215, but by 1933 it had fallen to 100:303. By 1933, 25 percent of all industrial plants in Hungary were idle for more than 50 days.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> According to the World Bank, Czechoslovak per capita GNP in 1989 was \$3,450, while in Trinidad and Tobago it was \$3,230. By comparison, Portugal's, a relatively poor West European nation, was \$4,250. See World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 204-205.

<sup>140</sup> Rothschild, 156-170.

Hungary was able to overcome its economic set back during the rearmament industrialization of the late 1930s. Its economic recovery was facilitated by alliance with Nazi-Germany which enabled Hungary to increase the percentage of its population engaged in industry by 35.7 percent between 1938 and 1943. Hungary's economic growth during the war was such that even though it lost 40 percent of its national wealth and 24 percent of its industrial capacity during the war, the remaining industrial capacity was still greater than what existed in 1938.<sup>141</sup> But, as with Czechoslovakia, nearly fifty years after the end of World War II Hungary finds itself with a per capita GNP only slightly better than Brazil's.<sup>142</sup>

The interwar economic development of Poland was somewhat different from that of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Because of the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, what industry there was in Poland was largely geared toward the Russian and German economies; markets which after the Great War became hostile foreign markets. Overall, pre-World War I Poland was largely an agrarian state. Therefore, in the interwar period, Poland found itself faced with three problems: reconstructing war related damage to industry; finding new markets; and a shortage of capital.<sup>143</sup> These problems were never adequately addressed and what little industrial

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<sup>141</sup>Ibid., 188-190.

<sup>142</sup>According to the International Bank, Hungary's 1989 per capita GNP was \$2,590, while Brazil's was \$2,540. Uruguay's was \$2,620. See World Development Report 1991, 204-105.

<sup>143</sup>E. Garrison Walters, The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 178.

growth Poland experienced prior to World War II was unable to improve the country's economic situation.<sup>144</sup> Following World War II, Poland experienced rapid industrialization so that by the 1980s it was the largest producer of electricity in Eastern Europe outside the Soviet Union and equaled Czechoslovakia in steel production.<sup>145</sup> Nevertheless, despite such impressive economic growth, in 1989 Poland's per capita GNP was the lowest among the three East Central European nations at only \$1,790.<sup>146</sup>

Given the level of industrialization among the East Central European nations at the end of World War II, how could it happen that Western European nations like France, Great Britain, and West Germany, whose industrial capacity was largely destroyed during the course of the war, overcame their wartime destruction to become leaders of the industrialized world, while Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland stagnated and even declined? The answer can be found simply in the economic system implemented by the Stalinist regimes in those countries at the behest of Soviet Russia. Put another way, the economic systems implemented in Eastern and Western Europe largely reflected the socio-political environment of the two regions. The capitalist system of the West reflected the openness and individuality inherent in the democracies of Britain, France, and West Germany, while the structured order of the planned economy reflected the

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<sup>144</sup>Rothschild, 68-69.

<sup>145</sup>Alan H. Smith ed., East European Economic Handbook (London: Euromonitor Publications, 1985), 171.

<sup>146</sup>World Development Report 1991, 204-205. Continuing our comparison of world GNPs, Poland's was less than Mauritius (\$1,990), but greater than Costa Rica (\$1,780).

control necessary in a totalitarian society. At the same time the economies of East Central Europe demonstrated a complete disregard for the basic premises of economics. By definition, *economics* is considered to be the effective, efficient use of resources to produce a given product. In a free market society, the business which uses its resources more effectively is rewarded through increased profits, while the firm which uses its resources inefficiently either changes its procedures or is forced out of business. In the command economies of Eastern Europe these principles were ignored. The firm which used its resources wisely was rewarded at the same level as the firm which squandered its resources. Therefore, the planned economies of East Central Europe slugged along using the same technology which required increasing amounts of manpower and resources, particularly energy resources, to produce its goods. In fact, to produce a unit of national income the countries of Eastern Europe used about twice as much energy as Western economies,<sup>147</sup> and their labor productivity was only about 40 percent of that in the West.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>147</sup>In a 1990 interview, Hungarian Minister for Economic Relations Bela Kadar stated, "[The Hungarian economy] uses about 40 percent more energy than average in the developed countries in unit good production, which is, in itself, an absurdity." See Zsolt Szalay, "Economic Relations Official on Oil Price Effects" (excerpts), Budapest Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian, 0630 GMT, 12 August 1990. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-90-156, 13 August 1990): 25.

<sup>148</sup>Vladimir Sobell, The CMEA in Crisis: Toward a New European Order? (New York: Praeger, 1990). 5.



The East European countries were aware of their technological backwardness and often used spurts of import substitution industrialization<sup>149</sup> to overcome their condition. Such a strategy was attempted after World War II, but the pace and character of industrialization was determined, not by economic bureaucrats in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, but by Soviet economic advisors with "shopping lists."<sup>150</sup> In this regard, the economic systems in East Central Europe were another means through which the Soviet Union could dominate and control them. Not only were all Five Year Plans coordinated through the Soviet embassies in each country,<sup>151</sup> but in effect the energy and raw material intensive manufacturing in East Central Europe tied the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish economies to a cheap source of raw materials and energy; the Soviet Union.<sup>152</sup>

The principal vehicle through which the Soviets operated the Eastern European economies was the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). As

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<sup>149</sup>Industrialization through the domestic replacement of imported finished goods. See Gerald M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 297-304.

<sup>150</sup>Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe." 157. In the Stalinist economic system the East European economies were geared toward *Soviet* needs. Therefore, Soviet economic advisors determined production goals for Eastern Europe based on inputs necessary for the Soviet economy. For example, Czechoslovak steel production would be determined by the amount of steel needed for production of finished goods in the Soviet Union.

<sup>151</sup>*Ibid.*, 158.

<sup>152</sup>Indeed, the proliferation of heavy industry throughout Eastern Europe as a whole made them overly dependent on the Soviet Union for raw materials and as a market. As a result, trade with the West was underdeveloped. Vladimir Sobell, "East European Economies at a Turning Point," Report on Eastern Europe, 4 May 1990, 41.

mentioned earlier (see Chapter II), the CMEA was established in 1949 as an alternative to the Marshall Plan submitted by the U.S. as a means of rebuilding war-torn Europe. Not only did CMEA encourage the continuation of inefficient and energy intensive industry within Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, but it also discouraged trade between these countries, as well as other, non-member countries. CMEA discouraged trade among its members through the use of the transferable ruble (TR) to pay for goods.<sup>153</sup> The TR discouraged trade through the simple fact that it was neither transferable nor a ruble. The TR was never a currency in the same manner as the Russian ruble, but merely a bookkeeping unit for trade between CMEA members.<sup>154</sup> And because it was not convertible the sizeable TR deficit the Soviets incurred with the East Central European nations meant very little.<sup>155</sup>


Despite the abysmal economic development and the inequalities inherent in CMEA trade, the East Central European nations and the Soviet Union were economically tied together. A glance at the level of trade between the CMEA partners illustrates the importance of Soviet trade. Figure 1 shows that while Soviet imports have declined since 1986, they still represent a significant share of total East Central European imports.

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
<sup>153</sup>Patrice Dabrowski, "East European Trade (Part I): The Loss of the Soviet Market," Report on Eastern Europe, 4 October 1991, 30.

<sup>154</sup>Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," 168.

<sup>155</sup>For example, between 1987 and 1991 the Soviets incurred a debt with Hungary of TR 2.457 billion. Through negotiations the Soviets agreed to convert this sum into dollars at a rate of 92 cents per TR. Therefore, the Soviets owe Hungary just over \$2.260 billion. "Talks With USSR To Settle Trade Debt" (text), Budapest MTI in English, 1552 GMT, 6 November 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-216, 7 November 1991): 12.



**Figure 1**



**Figure 2**

Figure 2<sup>156</sup> illustrates the same point with regard to East Central European exports to the Soviet Union.<sup>157</sup> Of course, because CMEA represented Soviet domination of the region, as well as the stifling of economic growth, it is no wonder Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland would want to turn to other means of improving their economic positions.


### C. THE WEST, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

In January 1991, the countries of the CMEA met to discuss the inevitable: the final disposition of their organization. The end of CMEA was probably a foregone conclusion once the communist regimes in Eastern Europe began to fall. Even in late 1989 trade between East Central Europe and the Soviet Union began to decline. While this may not seem very significant, the economic impact of declining trade with the Soviet Union has been considerable, particularly when one considers that Soviet, as well as inter-CMEA trade, consumed the bulk of East Central European commerce. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the rapid decline in trade between the Soviet Union and East Central Europe. In addition,


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<sup>156</sup>Figures for Poland for 1989 unavailable.

<sup>157</sup>However, it should be noted that this is changing. The effects of the decline in Soviet trade are slowly being offset by trade with the West, particularly Germany. For example, while the CIS remained the largest importer of Czechoslovak goods (32.3 percent) in 1991, it was the second overall exporter (19.4 percent) to Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, German exports to Czechoslovakia increased by 25 percent and German imports increased by 20.1 percent. During the same year, Hungarian exports to Germany increased by 33 percent. See Vlado Gajdosik, "Prospects for Foreign Trade Outlined" (text), Bratislava *Verejnost* in Slovak, 1 February 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-024, 5 February 1992): 12-13; also "Bilateral Trade With Germany Detailed" (excerpts), Dusseldorf *Handelsblatt* in German, 7 February 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-028, 11 February 1992): 8.



**Figure 3**



**Figure 4**

because of the heavy influence of CMEA trade on the economies of the East Central European nations, once trade began to decline the economic house of cards began to fall. For example, Poland's \$300 million trade deficit in the first quarter of 1991 was largely due to the decline in Soviet trade.<sup>158</sup> In fact, according to the Economic Commission for Europe, the economic situation in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990 was comparable to the situation in Western Europe at the end of World War II. At the time the Commission suggested a new Marshall Plan to save the struggling economies in the region, but the Commission said the new plan would differ in that large amounts of technical aid would be needed to help in the transition from planned economies to a free market. However, while the Commission stated that it did not necessarily mean to imply technical aid over financial aid, this seems to be what is taking place.<sup>159</sup>

This may not necessarily be a bad thing, nor is it necessarily what the nations of East Central Europe want. In the first place, there is no doubt that some type of technical aid or advisors will be needed to repair their economic infrastructure and even to train people to become effective managers in a free market system. Therefore, in a sense, the nations of East Central Europe find themselves faced with the same problems as the Polish leadership following World War I: repairing not necessarily war damaged industry, but upgrading industrial technology; finding new markets; and a shortage of capital.

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<sup>158</sup>Stephen Engelberg, "Eastern Europe's Hardships Grow as Trade with Soviets Dries Up," The New York Times, 6 May 1991, A1.

<sup>159</sup>Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1990-1991 (New York: United Nations, 1991), 5.

Obviously the road to achieving these goals lies to the West, since logically if you want to be successful one seeks advice from others who are successful. But stating one's goals is one thing and realizing them is quite another. While Western Europe may be willing to invest in East Central Europe, investment is selective and more importantly not really what the governments of East Central Europe believe will get them out of their economic bind. To Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland the key to economic recovery is membership in the European Community (EC) and establishing markets for their goods in Western Europe.<sup>160</sup>

This does not mean that the East Central European nations do not want Western investment, for certainly they realize that foreign capital is needed particularly to repair and build new industrial infrastructure. On the other hand, perhaps they realize that in a free market environment the investor must feel that he will get a good return on his investment, something which Western investors may not believe is possible right now. In fact, the very conditions in the region which must be overcome to allow economic growth may form obstacles to foreign investment. First, for the near term the East Central European economies may be driven by public expenditures and not market forces. The legacy of pollution carried over from the communist period must be dealt with effectively before further industrial growth can be attempted. Second, while hourly wages

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<sup>160</sup>In a July 1991, interview Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier stated, "[T]he most important assistance [from the West] would be to have doors in the West opened to our exports." Ana Antolin, "Dienstbier on European Security, USSR Treaty" (excerpt), Madrid ABC in Spanish, 28 July 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-151, 6 August 1991): 11.

in East Central Europe are relatively low when compared to those in Western Europe, giving East Central Europe a comparative advantage in manufacturing, newly opened borders to the West have lead to the fear of a "brain-drain" as the best and brightest Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, and Poles venture West in search of better paying jobs and a better life. However, perhaps the greatest obstacle to Western investment lies with the soaring East Central European foreign debt.<sup>161</sup> In 1989, the combined East Central European foreign debt was \$71.8 billion (\$7.9 billion for Czechoslovakia, \$20.6 billion for Hungary, and \$43.3 billion for Poland). In 1992, Hungary's debt is projected to reach \$21.512 billion and Poland's \$33.078 billion<sup>162</sup> (these figures do not include International Monetary Fund loans).<sup>163</sup>

There are also domestic barriers to foreign investment and implied privatization. One reservation results from the fact that East Central Europe's obsolescent factories were over staffed in order to hide unemployment. Privatization could mean that one-third of all employees would be out of a job. Perhaps the greatest domestic concern lies with the fact that joint ventures between domestic and foreign businesses could result in as much

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<sup>161</sup>Derek Leebaert, "A (Fool's?) Gold Rush in Eastern Europe," Orbis 34 (Fall 1990): 551-553.

<sup>162</sup>The good news for Poland is that Germany has agreed to forgive part of Poland's debt to Germany. On 19 February 1992, the German Finance Ministry announced it would forgive \$5.5 billion (about 50 percent) of Poland's debt to the German government. The remaining 50 percent is to be repaid over 18 years at market interest rates. However, the \$11.5 billion Poland still owes German commercial banks was not affected by the agreement. Roman Stefanowski, "Germany Forgives Half of Poland's Government Debt," RFE/RL Daily Report, 20 February 1992.

<sup>163</sup>World Debt Tables 1990-1991 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1991).



as one-third of East Central European industrial assets being foreign owned.<sup>164</sup> In Czechoslovakia, there are complaints that too much Western investment may "become a political and economic problem."<sup>165</sup> At the same time, Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Kraus, in January 1992, indicated his annoyance at Western investors who complained the federal government was not doing enough to support foreign investment. Kraus stated there was no reason to give foreign enterprises specific help not available to domestic producers.<sup>166</sup> These two instances are indicative of an increasing anti-foreigner sentiment throughout the region stemming from the fear that too much of their domestic industry is becoming controlled by foreign interests.

However, one should not get the impression that no foreign capital is flowing into East Central Europe. Quite the contrary. But the fact is that in the brutal realities of market economics the ultimate question any potential investor must answer is, "What's in it for me?" Indeed, investors are deciding that the rewards are worth the risk. In December 1990, the Czech Republic government announced that Volkswagen had won out over Renault-Volvo in buying into Skoda, the state owned car company. In the largest cross-border investment in European history, Volkswagen agreed to invest DM9.5 billion (\$6.3 billion) over seven years with an initial investment of DM500 million (\$333 million).

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<sup>164</sup>Leebaert, 554-555.

<sup>165</sup>Berthold Koller, "Kraus Criticizes Western Investors' Support Call" (excerpt), Frankfurt-am-Main Frankfurter Allgemeine in German, 16 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-011, 16 January 1992): 19.

<sup>166</sup>Ibid., 18.

Initially, Volkswagen would own a 31 percent share of the Czechoslovak car company, but by 1995 this would grow to 70-75 percent. Volkswagen's motivation for the deal was its desire to find a way of penetrating the East European car market. For the Czechs, the huge amount of the deal may encourage further investment in their economy.<sup>167</sup>

Elsewhere in East Central Europe, investment is also increasing. In Hungary less bureaucratic stonewalling as well as tax exemptions for foreign investors has led to increased investment.<sup>168</sup> In fact, in 1990, the EC pledged \$15 billion to Poland and Hungary through 1992 and the Group of 24 nations promised \$3.8 billion to Czechoslovakia.<sup>169</sup> Yet despite these pledges, other investment is not as great as it could be. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Western bank loans to Eastern Europe declined by \$6.4 billion in the first quarter of 1990 and had dried up by December 1990.<sup>170</sup> The Economic Commission for Europe stated that between October 1989, and January 1991, the number of investors in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union jumped from 2,900 to 16,700, but the amounts of foreign capital

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<sup>167</sup>Jan Obrman, "Skoda Becomes Part of the Volkswagen Empire," Report on Eastern Europe, 25 January 1991, 7-11.

<sup>168</sup>"Less Talk, More Action Please," The Economist, 16 February 1991, 54.

<sup>169</sup>Marvin Jackson, "The International Economic Situation and Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern Europe, 28 December 1990, 39.

<sup>170</sup>*Ibid.*, 39.

involved were small. In October 1989, foreign investment averaged \$1 million, but in January 1991, the average was only \$500,000.<sup>171</sup>

Capital investment is only one side of the development issue, albeit an important one. The East Central European nations seem to be caught in a Catch-22 where they need financial capital to improve their economies, but foreign investors are unwilling to invest significant amounts of capital until the economies improve. Perhaps for this reason the governments believe that the real road to economic recovery is through the EC and cultivating new markets in the West. But here, again, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland find the road a rough one. Not only does EC membership seem almost within their grasp, but still far away, but EC restrictions place barriers on their entry into Western markets.

In late 1989, the EC seemed to want Eastern Europe as part of their organization, but only on the periphery. At the time, EC Commission President Jacques Delors was afraid the events in Eastern Europe would upset progress toward greater union among the West European nations. His view of Europe and the EC envisaged a series of concentric circles with the center circle consisting of those EC members committed to closer integration; the second circle consisting of those members not committed to closer integration (e.g., Great Britain); the third circle encompassing the nations of the European Free Trade Association; and the fourth, outer, circle encompassing Eastern Europe. While Delors was articulating his view on the EC and the future of Europe, however, he was opposed

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<sup>171</sup>Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, 6.

to closer integration for Eastern Europe for fear of upsetting the Soviets, particularly since there were those in Western Europe who viewed the EC as the core of a future defensive arrangement.<sup>172</sup>

By the end of 1990 EC members had already concluded trade agreements with several CMEA members. But at the same time, events in Eastern Europe were causing problems for the EC. The poorer EC members were afraid Northern European members, such as France and Germany, would send aid to Eastern Europe instead of them. Elsewhere, the French farmers union was afraid it would be hurt by increased agricultural imports from Hungary and Poland.<sup>173</sup> In order to help bring Eastern Europe into the EC orbit, Delors proposed the EC speed up integration to strengthen the EC as a pan-European organization, while at the same time intensifying its ties to Eastern Europe. Delors also stated that it was the EC's duty to get the Eastern European economies on the road to full EC membership, a duty which would cost 14 billion ECU (European Currency Units) (\$17 billion) a year.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>172</sup>"Westward Ho," The Economist, 25 November 1989, 58.

<sup>173</sup>French farmers may face serious competition in agriculture, particularly from Poland. In agricultural output, Poland is second in Europe only to France. Its sugarbeet production is third after France and Germany. In potato production Poland produces nearly as much as all of the EC combined. Roger Boyes, "Snails Trailing in Polish Race for Western Markets," Times (London), 17 December 1991, 11.

<sup>174</sup>Vladimir Sobell, "Eastern Europe and the European Community," Report on Eastern Europe, 23 February 1990, 45-47.

Despite Delors' generous offer, there are those who feel the EC may, in fact, be an obstacle to East Central European economic recovery.<sup>175</sup> One observer described Delors' plan as "with one hand throwing the financial rope to Eastern Europe, but with the other pulling up [the community's] institutional ladder."<sup>176</sup> In other words, while the EC seems perfectly willing to throw money at the East Central European economic problems, they are unwilling to open certain markets to East Central European goods. This is particularly true with regard to textiles, steel, and agricultural products. These are the areas where Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland believe they are competitive, but are kept out because of EC trade restrictions.<sup>177</sup>

In December 1991, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland received associate membership in the EC and it seems realistic they could be full members before the turn of the century.<sup>178</sup> But there are those in East Central Europe who believe the EC

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<sup>175</sup>Leebaert, 562.

<sup>176</sup>Sobell, "Eastern Europe and the European Community," 47.

<sup>177</sup>"Open Up," The Economist, 3 August 1991, 17. See also Josef C. Brada, "The European Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Report on Eastern Europe, 6 December 1991, 28.

<sup>178</sup>The "Associate Agreements" between the East Central European nations and the EC largely represent a political victory for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland in that they formally acknowledged each nation's intent to enter the EC. Each agreement is valid for ten years during which time Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland are to take steps to restructure their economies in preparation for becoming EC members. These are incorporated in a series of principles to which all EC members agree to adhere. These principles include: budget deficits not exceeding 3 percent by the end of the decade; and inflation rates no higher than 1.5 percent above the average rate in the three member nations with the lowest inflation rate. Since its inception in 1957, the EC has concluded a number of "associate" agreements with various countries. These were signed for various reasons such as promoting economic development, in the case of Third World countries, or expanding European trade, as with the European Free Trade Association. Associate membership is not necessarily a requirement for membership (the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined in 1973 without such an agreement), although Greece joined the EC after an associate

agreement is one sided. They see EC as asking Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to open their markets, while EC markets remain closed to East Central European goods.<sup>179</sup> There is some truth to this. While the EC will open some markets to Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish goods, agricultural markets will remain restricted for ten years. Likewise, tariffs on steel will remain in place for five years and those on textiles for six.<sup>180</sup> So, while associate membership is a victory for the East Central European states, it is only a partial victory. They must compete in the West at a disadvantage, while at the same time struggling to improve their production capability.

#### **D. RUSSIA AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPE**

Of course, as Soviet troops are withdrawn from East Central Europe, Russia will be unable to *militarily* influence policy in the region, but based on the economic ties instituted by the Soviet Union, Russia will have a substantial foreign policy lever for the near term. There are three sides of this issue which will allow Russia to apply economic pressure to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland: Russian markets, Russian debts, and Russian resources, especially oil and natural gas. In this connection, the fact that the Soviets were not nearly as dependent upon mutual trade as their counterparts in East

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agreement lasting twenty years. See Jan de Weydenthal, "Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland Gain Associate Membership in the EC," RFE/RL Research Report, 7 February 1992, 24-26.

<sup>179</sup>Brada, "The European Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," 31.

<sup>180</sup>"EC Spokesman Comments" (text), Budapest MTI in English, 1013 GMT, 16 December 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-242, 17 December 1991): 1.

Central Europe is significant. As Figures 5 and 6<sup>181</sup> illustrate, at the most, Soviet exports to the East Central European nations accounted for just over 10 percent of total imports. while exports never exceeded 10 percent.


Aside from total imports, there is the issue of East Central European dependence on Soviet (now Russian) oil and natural gas. Indeed, the Economic Commission for Europe stated the biggest constraint to East European growth was a lack of fuel.<sup>182</sup> As we have already noted, the Stalinist economic system employed by the East Central European nations required inordinate amounts of energy; energy which the Soviet Union was willing to provide at prices substantially below world market prices (for example, the Soviet Union charged as little as \$7 per barrel for oil). As a result of these arrangements, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, relied upon the Soviet Union to provide as much as 95 percent of their crude oil and nearly 100 percent of their natural gas supplies.

East Central European reliance on foreign energy resources is only one side of the much larger issue of continued trade with Russia -- the forty year trade ties through CMEA will not disappear overnight. Even though trade with the former Soviet Union is falling off dramatically, replacement markets are not being found at an equal or greater rate and with EC restrictions on certain goods, the East Central European nations will have to look elsewhere for markets for those goods. Russia represents a potentially large untapped market for those goods shut out of EC markets. Although Russia will be able


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<sup>181</sup>Figures for Poland for 1989 unavailable.

<sup>182</sup>Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, 3.



**Figure 5**



**Figure 6**



to purchase better and cheaper consumer goods from the West, it will still be able to look to East Central Europe for other items, especially agricultural products. Trade in this area will certainly work to their mutual advantage: Russia needs food, and East Central Europe wants to trade its agricultural products.<sup>183</sup> By the same token, the East Central European nations still require large amounts of Russian crude oil and natural gas.<sup>184</sup>

While the large Russian market offers opportunities for East Central European development, this is offset by serious trade issues. The two most serious issues currently are Russia's foreign debt and its declining oil production. Not only has Russia run up a sizeable foreign debt of its own with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, but it has assumed the lion's share of the former Soviet debt as well.<sup>185</sup> We have already noted that the Soviet government owed Hungary about \$2.260 billion. In addition, the Soviets owed R4.6 billion to Czechoslovakia, which by agreement was converted on a one for one

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<sup>183</sup>Hungary, for example, harvested 15 million metric tonnes of grain in 1991 and had hoped associate membership in the EC would open better markets in Western Europe. However, since EC agricultural markets are to remain restricted, Hungary will certainly want to look elsewhere for grain markets. "Secretary Reports 1991 Harvest 'Highly Favorable'" (text), Budapest MTI in English, 1424 GMT, 29 November 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-231, 2 December 1991): 16.

<sup>184</sup>In this regard, Vitaliy Zhurkin, Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences European Institute, stated in a 26 July 1991 interview: "The USSR has been and remains a market for many products of the East European Countries because -- to put it quite frankly -- while these products sell sluggishly in the Western market, they often sell far better than Soviet products. In addition, we have created a powerful infrastructure -- oil pipelines, gas pipelines, railroad freight lines, a fixed interconnection of electricity networks, etc." Aleksey Borzenko, "Official Interviewed on Relations with Europe" (text), Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian, 26 July 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-155, 12 August 1991): 15.

<sup>185</sup>See page 3 above for a discussion of the responsibility of the former Soviet debt shared by Belarus', Russia, and Ukraine.

basis into \$4.6 billion, and R7.2 billion to Poland (conversion amount not indicated).<sup>186</sup> Although Russia, Belarus', and Ukraine have agreed to assume nearly 80 percent of the former Soviet debt, the issue for the East Central European nations is not so much *who* will pay, but *when* they will be paid. This concern is complicated by the fact that repayment of the Soviet debt must be negotiated individually with each of the successor states. While the Hungarians would like to have their foreign debt settled as soon as possible, the Soviets stated that debt repayment would be spread over a five year period.<sup>187</sup> However, Russia has agreed to repay \$300-350 million of the amount in 1992.<sup>188</sup> By the same token, Czechoslovakia does not expect repayment of its debt before 1995.<sup>189</sup>

Nor are Russia's debt woes limited to East Central Europe. At home the Russian Finance Ministry announced a government deficit of R84 billion in the first quarter of 1992, as compared to an *annual* government deficit of R70 billion in 1991.<sup>190</sup> At the

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<sup>186</sup>"Soviet Business Report Dated 'September 26,1991'" (text), Moscow Interfax in English, 2030 GMT, 25 September 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-187, 26 September 1991): 12.

<sup>187</sup>"Talks With USSR To Settle Trade Debt," 12.

<sup>188</sup>"Economic Ties to Commonwealth Republics 'Healthy'" (text), Budapest MTI in English, 1640 GMT, 16 December 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-242, 17 December 1991): 22.

<sup>189</sup>Marcela Doleckova, "Ministry Official Discusses Soviet Trade Issues" (excerpts), Prague Hospodarske Noviny in Czech, 25 November 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe, (FBIS-EEU-91-234, 5 December 1991): 8.

<sup>190</sup>Irina Demchenko, "First Quarter Deficit of R84 Billion Projected" (text), Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, 24 March 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-057, 24 March 1992): 49.

same time, Yurii Gromushkin, advisor to the Russian Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, stated that Russia was unable to service all of its foreign debt because it had shouldered 90 percent of the former Soviet debt. In order to make payments, he said, Russia has had to freeze individual and company hard currency accounts.<sup>191</sup> In addition, in February, First Deputy Foreign Minister Petr Aven said that other members of the CIS were not paying their share of the former Soviet debt. Aven stated that Russia owes \$8.7 billion this year and might seek partial referral of interest payments following the postponement of \$11.1 billion in principal payments agreed to by Western creditors.<sup>192</sup> The magnitude of the Russian debt and the difficulties in paying even the interest on its debt poses serious trade problems for Russia not only in East Central Europe, but throughout the world.

However, measures are being taken to ensure payment of the rising Russian debt. On 16 January 1992, Russia and Czechoslovakia signed a \$1.7 billion trade accord in which \$163 million would be earmarked to pay the Russian debt to Czechoslovakia.<sup>193</sup> In February, the Czechoslovak Commercial Bank Shareholding Company opened a bank

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<sup>191</sup>Keith Bush, "External Debt Repayment," RFE/RL Daily Report, 13 March 1992.

<sup>192</sup>Keith Bush, "CIS Meeting on Debt Service," RFE/RL Daily Report, 24 February 1992. In January 1992, the Paris Club agreed to postpone servicing of the principle on medium and long term credit received prior to 1 January 1991. Under the agreement, the republics of the former Soviet Union would only have to pay \$9 billion of the overdue debt of \$20 billion in 1992. "Economic Official on Paris Talks, Debt" (text), Moscow RIA in English, 1913 GMT, 9 January 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-011-A, 16 January 1992): 9.

<sup>193</sup>"Joint CSFR Oil Export Protocol Signed" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 0825 GMT, 17 January 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-015, 23 January 1992): 28.

account for the Russian Federation Foreign Trade Bank. Thirty-eight percent of the value of all Russian exports to Czechoslovakia will be placed in this account. These funds are intended exclusively to pay for Russian purchases in Czechoslovakia and to repay the former Soviet debt to Czechoslovakia.<sup>194</sup>

Not only are the East Central European nations having difficulty collecting previous debts from the Soviet successor states, but they are also having problems receiving payment for current transactions which in turn is interfering with trade. The East Central European nations want to trade with Russia, but Russia is unable to pay for the goods it imports. For example, by the end of March 1991, Poland had paid \$300 million for Soviet imports, but had received only \$20 million for its exports to the Soviet Union.<sup>195</sup> Likewise, in August 1991, Hungarian officials indicated that while the Soviets had ordered \$400 million worth of pharmaceuticals, by August Hungary had received only \$6 million in payment.<sup>196</sup> These difficulties have led, at least in Czechoslovakia, to the promise to withhold payment for Russian oil and raw materials to ensure payment of goods exported to Russia. In January 1992, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Trade Minister

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<sup>194</sup>"New Payment Method Defined for Trade with Russia" (text), Prague *Hospodarske Noviny* in Czech, 27 February 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-041, 2 March 1992): 14.

<sup>195</sup>"Disastrously Low' Exports to USSR Reported" (text), Warsaw PAP in English, 1528 GMT, 11 April 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-071, 12 April 1991): 20.

<sup>196</sup>"Minister Views Economic Ties with USSR" (text), Budapest MTI in English, 1306 GMT, 26 August 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-166, 27 August 1991): 21.

Lubomir Martak stated that Czechoslovak companies would only begin exporting goods to Russia when "money has been paid into our bank accounts."<sup>197</sup>

For the Russians, the balance of payment difficulties stem from a lack of hard currency. In the first seven months of 1991, Eastern Europe paid for its raw material and energy imports from the Soviet Union in hard currency, while the Soviets were unable to reciprocate.<sup>198</sup> Part of the problem stems from the fact that 80 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings came from energy exports.<sup>199</sup> Therefore, sagging oil production and the resulting decline in crude oil exports combine to decrease the amount of hard currency coming into Russian accounts.

The subtle irony of the cash flow problem between the former Soviet Union and East Central Europe is that it resulted from the adoption of hard currency payment by CMEA on 1 January 1991; a proposal put forward by the Soviets.<sup>200</sup> As a result, economic transactions between Russia and East Central Europe have returned to barter trade. Despite the fact that it was outlawed by the Soviet government in 1991, barter trade has grown. Generally these agreements include East Central European agricultural products in return for Soviet energy, although they have included other items. In late 1990, Poland

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<sup>197</sup>Barbara Kroulik, "Czechoslovak Trade With Russia," RFE/RL Daily Report, 28 January 1992.

<sup>198</sup>Patrice Dabrowski, "European Trade (Part II): Creative Solutions by the Former Eastern Bloc," Report on Eastern Europe, 11 October 1991, 29.

<sup>199</sup>John M. Kramer, "Eastern Europe and the 'Energy Shock' of 1990-91," 86.

<sup>200</sup>Patrice Dabrowski, "East European Trade (Part III): Getting the West Involved," Report on Eastern Europe, 18 October 1991, 30.

agreed to trade food and tobacco valued at \$120 million in return for natural gas. In addition, the Soviets agreed to provide 200,000 barrels of oil per day in 1991. At the same time, Czechoslovakia, in an agreement apparently directly with the Tyumen oil region, agreed to barter heavy equipment in return for 500,000 metric tonnes (MT)<sup>201</sup> of oil.<sup>202</sup> However, these agreements seem rather small when compared to the agreement signed by Deputy Foreign Trade Ministers Andrzej Olechowski of Poland and Vladimir Rabotiyazov of Russia on 24 December 1991. In that agreement Russia agreed to provide five million MT of oil and eight billion cubic meters of natural gas in exchange for \$400 million worth of coal, pharmaceuticals, sulphur, and coking coal, in addition to \$500 million in food.<sup>203</sup>


However, there is a danger if Russia places all its faith in oil for saving its foreign trade. Since 1988, Soviet oil production, and related oil exports, have been falling dramatically, as Figures 7 and 8 indicate. Although decreases in production were not that great initially, as early as 1990, experts in the U.S. were predicting a drop in Soviet oil production. At the time they blamed the impending decline on depleted oil fields, a shortage of funds for off-shore and Arctic Circle exploration, as well as waterlogged oil fields which resulted from Soviet attempts to increase production by injecting water into

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
<sup>201</sup>One metric tonne of oil is equivalent to 7.3 barrels of 42 gallons each. "Soviet Exports of Oil Plunge," The New York Times, 10 February 1992, C4.

<sup>202</sup>"Food for Oil and Gas," The Wall Street Journal, 15 October 1990, A13.

<sup>203</sup>"Deputy Minister Signs Russian Trade Agreement" (text), Warsaw PAP in English, 1648 GMT, 24 December 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-249, 27 December 1991): 18.



**Figure 7**



**Figure 8**

oil wells.<sup>204</sup> In the past year Soviet revelations have supported this conclusion. In January 1992, experts said that 41 percent of the oil reserves of the former Soviet Union had been exhausted. The report went on to say that the remainder would be sufficient for thirty to fifty years. However, if no new wells are sunk, no oil will be produced in five years time, particularly at the current rate of extraction which is three to five times greater than Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.<sup>205</sup> In fact, in October 1991, Ilya Leschints, an executive with the USSR Oil and Gas Ministry, stated that the fall in oil production resulted from the fact that fewer wells were being drilled. According to Leschints, it would take 11,000 new wells to keep production at a stable level, but only 7,500 new wells are being commissioned.<sup>206</sup> In a separate report, it has been speculated that oil production throughout the former Soviet Union could fall to 400 million MT in 1992.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>204</sup>Peter Martin, "The Oil Crisis and Prospects for Foreign Trade," Report on Eastern Europe, 31 August 1990, 8.

<sup>205</sup>"Forty-One Percent of Oil Reserves Said 'Exhausted'" (text), Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian, 1500 GMT, 31 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-025, 6 February 1992): 48. In contrast to this report is one in June 1991, which stated 80 percent of Soviet oil deposits had been exhausted. "Technical Problems in Oil Production Viewed" (text), Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English, 2300 GMT, 2 June 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-107, 4 June 1991): 21.

<sup>206</sup>"Business Report Views Crisis in Oil Industry" (text), Moscow Interfax in English, 2200 GMT, 9 October 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-198, 11 October 1991): 22.

<sup>207</sup>There is also speculation in Russia that even the 400 million MT figure may not be met. While reports say Russian output will reach 350-360 million MT in 1992. President of the Russian state oil corporation, *Rosneftegaz*, Lev Churilov, said in March that the 400 million MT target may not be met if oil production continued to decline at a rate of 20,000 MT a day. He blamed the decline in production on the lack of central control and the abnormally low price of oil, R350 per tonne (about \$3.50). Churilov said he believed the price of oil should be raised to R2,200 to R2,500 per tonne (\$22.00 to \$25.00). See Keith Bush, "Forecast of Oil output and Exports," RFE/RL Daily Report, 20 February 1992; and "Oil Shortfall Blamed on Central Control" (text), Moscow Interfax in English, 1621 GMT, 9 March 1992. FBIS Daily



The same report stated that if all the oil wells that were out of commission in *Russia* were restarted, output would rise by about 24 million MT per year.<sup>208</sup>

Of course, any reduction in oil revenues impacts Russia the most. In 1989, Russia produced nearly 91 percent of all Soviet oil<sup>209</sup> and just over 91 percent of the 1991 total.<sup>210</sup> Over one-half of this total comes from the Tyumen oil region which produces 6.1 million barrels of oil per day, more than any *nation* except Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Although output is still high, compared to other oil producing nations, without modern equipment oil output will not increase. At the same time, Russian oil producers cannot raise the necessary funds to modernize their operations. Under current rules, Russian oil companies are required to sell most of their oil to the state at artificially low prices; the equivalent of 80 cents per barrel.<sup>211</sup> At the same time, 40 percent of their foreign currency earnings are required to be exchanged with the government at the rate of .61 ruble to the dollar.<sup>212</sup>

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Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-048, 11 March 1992): 34.

<sup>208</sup>Deborah Hargreaves, "Soviet Oil Production to Fall by 13 Percent," Financial Times (London), 29 January 1992, 28.

<sup>209</sup>Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989 (Moscow: 1990), 338.

<sup>210</sup>Louis Uchitelle, "A Failed Cliché in Siberia: Rich in Oil, but not 'Oil Rich'," The New York Times, 11 February 1992, A1.

<sup>211</sup>*Ibid.*, A6.

<sup>212</sup>"Soviet Oil Exports Decline; Republics Blame Two Laws," The Wall Street Journal, 5 August 1991, A11.

There is no doubt Russia could modernize its oil industry if its oil could be sold at world market prices, but getting the initial investment is the difficulty. American oil companies are hesitant to invest large sums in Russian oil production because of the substantial export tax and because they fear that modern Western technology will not be needed by the late 1990s.<sup>213</sup> In addition, it seems that Western technology may not be as badly needed as at first thought. In one joint operation, American equipment was used at first until Russian equipment was found to be cheaper and good enough for the task, especially when Western drilling techniques were used.<sup>214</sup>

Given this discovery it appears that Russia's oil worries can be solved by raising oil prices and cutting the export tax. But can the Russians do that? While the artificial oil price makes oil production unprofitable, it does give the Russian people a cheap source of fuel. If oil prices are raised, how will the Russians feel about higher heating oil prices in addition to other soaring costs? Indeed, the Russian leadership plans to continue the deregulation of the price structure begun on 1 January 1992. However, their efforts have been resisted by continuing inflation caused by loosening of price controls. In March, Yeltsin told the leaders of political parties and democratic movements that deregulation

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<sup>213</sup>American oil companies are afraid the Russians will use Western technology to increase production in order to generate more revenues from sales. The increased profits would then be used to develop Russian technology, or copy and produce Western technology, so that by the late 1990s Western companies would no longer be needed.

<sup>214</sup>Louis Uchitelle, "American Oilmen Wary on Russia," The New York Times, 11 February 1992, C2.

of fuel prices, originally set for 20 April would be delayed until May or June.<sup>215</sup> Nevertheless, Yeltsin continues to receive criticism from opponents who say he is moving too fast. The chairman of the Russia Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, said in March that further price liberalization would destroy Russian industry and harm the population.<sup>216</sup> However, First Deputy Prime Minister Egor Gaidar defended deregulation of energy prices, saying:

The current structure of prices, based on cheap energy, cannot continue. A little longer and the whole sector will grind to a halt and will bring the whole economy down with it.<sup>217</sup>

Despite criticism, however, on 18 May Yeltsin signed a resolution raising the price of oil from 48 cents per barrel to between \$2.47 and \$3.01 per barrel. While this represents an increase of over 500 percent, it is still well below the current market price of \$20 per barrel. For the consumer this means an increase in the price of gasoline to 30 cents per gallon, as compared to only two cents per gallon four months previous.<sup>218</sup>

The East Central European nations have already come face-to-face with this prospect. Not only did the price of Soviet crude rise to the world market price on 1 January 1991, but the overall decline in Soviet oil exports raised fears of a complete shut off of oil

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<sup>215</sup>Keith Bush, "Deregulation of Russian Energy Prices," RFE/RL Daily Report, 25 March 1992.

<sup>216</sup>Keith Bush, "Dispute Over Energy Prices," RFE/RL Daily Report, 26 March 1992.

<sup>217</sup>Ibid.

<sup>218</sup>Celestine Bohlen, "Yeltsin Removes Limits on Prices for Oil and Gas," The New York Times, 19 May 1992, C9.

supplies from the Soviet Union. In April 1992, Poland's Andrzej Olchowski, now finance minister, expressed his country's fears when he said that Poland was dependent on Russian energy and was horrified by the "prospect of an economic conflict between Russia and Ukraine that could stop supplies."<sup>219</sup>

In addition, while natural gas production has been increasing, Russia has been threatening to decrease exports of natural gas to East Central Europe. Poland is particularly affected where industry is suffering from deliveries which in January 1992, were 55 percent below normal.<sup>220</sup> Poland states that neither political nor economic stability on their part is to blame; the shortages are clearly the fault of the Russian

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<sup>219</sup>Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "Poland Wants Share of CIS Trade," RFE/RL Daily Report, 3 April 1992.

<sup>220</sup>Sergey Mushkaterov, "Talks With Poland on 1992 Deal Reviewed" (text), Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, 29 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-92-021, 31 January 1992): 29.

administration.<sup>221</sup> Nevertheless, Poland has no choice but to accept natural gas from Russia.<sup>222</sup>

Faced with uncertain Russian oil and natural gas supplies the East Central European nations have begun looking for alternative sources of energy. Primarily, negotiations have been conducted with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In January 1991, Hungary signed an agreement to buy four million MT of oil from Saudi Arabia.<sup>223</sup> In May, Iran concluded an agreement with Hungary to provide one million MT of oil. Although the Iranian negotiations were successful in finding other energy sources, they also illustrated the predicament in which the East Central European nations find themselves; the negotiations were difficult because Iran wanted Hungary to pay more than the market

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<sup>221</sup>Throughout January 1992, there seems to have been some confusion as to whether or not there was, in fact, a drop in Russian supplies of oil and natural gas. On 24 January, the Polish ministry of foreign economic relations said Poland was only getting 55 percent of normal natural gas supplies from Russia and none of its oil. However, a government press spokesman said the January quota of oil was reaching Poland, but that natural gas supplies were only 60 percent of the level agreed to by Russia and Poland. Nevertheless, on 27 January, it was announced that Russian oil deliveries to Poland had resumed after a break since 13 January. Eighty thousand tonnes were delivered on 27 January, and another 70,000 MT were promised before the end of the month. However, even with these amounts, plus the 130,000 MT delivered prior to 13 January, Russian deliveries would not meet the 300,000 MT quota agreed upon. See "'Confusion' Over Reports on Russian Gas Supplies" (text), Warsaw PAP in English, 2234 GMT, 24 January 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-017, 27 January 1992): 22; and "'Soviet' Oil Deliveries Resume; Gas Shortage" (text), Warsaw PAP in English, 1622 GMT, 27 January 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-018, 28 January 1992): 18-19.

<sup>222</sup>"Russia To Restrict Natural Gas Supplies" (text), Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish, 1300 GMT, 13 January 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-008, 13 January 1992): 24.

<sup>223</sup>"Agreement Reached With Saudi Arabia To Buy Oil" (text), Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian, 1700 GMT, 7 January 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-005, 8 January 1991): 22.

price for its oil.<sup>224</sup> In June, Iran also agreed to takeover lagging Soviet oil exports to Czechoslovakia, providing about 12 million MT through Yugoslavia's Adria pipeline.<sup>225</sup>

Despite these alternate sources, the East Central European nations admit that Russian oil would be cheaper simply from the standpoint of transportation costs. The Friendship Pipeline already connects Russia with Eastern Europe, requiring no additional transportation means. In addition, the civil war in Yugoslavia has interrupted the flow of oil from the Adria Pipeline. Croatian operators indicate their portion of the pipeline is intact, but there has been no clear information from the Serbian side.<sup>226</sup> Oil still flows from Russia, but alternate sources for Middle Eastern oil must now be found. Hungary is looking to receive oil via Western Europe through the Austrian pipeline, but

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<sup>224</sup>"Minister on Oil Purchase From Iran" (text), Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian, 1200 GMT, 1 May 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-085, 2 May 1991): 21.

<sup>225</sup>"Industry Minister on Iranian Oil Deal" (text), Prague CTK in English, 1601 GMT, 20 June 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-123, 26 June 1991): 10. Czechoslovakia may also participate in constructing a pipeline connecting Iranian natural gas fields with Central and Western Europe through Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Austria. From Austria the pipeline would branch out to Germany, France, and Central Europe, including Czechoslovakia. Annual capacity of the pipeline is estimated at 28-32 billion cubic meters, of which Czechoslovakia would take 4-6 billion. The pipeline is no doubt an attempt to find alternate supplies to Russian natural gas.

<sup>226</sup>"Oil, Gas Trust Analyzes Resources, Import Supply" (text), Budapest Magyar Nemzet in Hungarian, 9 November 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-220, 14 November 1991): 21. Apparently there is nothing physically wrong with the pipeline. It was shut off on 16 September 1991, purely for political reasons. However, there is still no indication as to when it will be reopened. In January 1992 a Czechoslovak government delegation was planning to travel to Croatia and Slovenia to discuss reopening the pipeline, but in the meantime Czechoslovakia is still looking for alternative oil sources. See "Adria Pipeline Still Closed Due to Politics" (text), Budapest MTI in English, 1802 GMT, 12 February 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-030, 13 February 1992): 9; and "Oil Flowing From Russia; Other Routes Outlined" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 2139 GMT, 24 January 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-017, 27 January 1992): 11.

this could take years and an undetermined amount of money to complete.<sup>227</sup> Hungary could also receive oil by rail from Rotterdam, and if Russia stops exporting oil, Hungary could get Iranian oil through Romania and the Friendship Pipeline.<sup>228</sup>

Czechoslovakia probably finds itself in a similar situation. However, Czechoslovakia has taken the initiative to find alternative European sources for oil. At the first NACC meeting in December 1991, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier discussed with Secretary of State Baker and NATO Secretary General Wörner the need to accelerate the building of new pipelines in order to diversify Czechoslovakia's oil supplies.<sup>229</sup> In February 1992, the Czech Republic government approved the construction of an oil pipeline from Germany. Pipeline operations are expected to begin in 1994 or 1995<sup>230</sup> and should have a capacity of 10 to 15 million tonnes per year.<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>227</sup>"Alternative Source of Oil Imports Explored" (text), Budapest MTI in English, 1252 GMT, 6 November 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-216, 7 November 1991): 13.

<sup>228</sup>"Commerce Minister on Impact" (text), Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian, 1700 GMT, 17 November 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-222, 18 November 1991): 16.

<sup>229</sup>"Dienstbier Discusses NACC Meeting Talks" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 1437 GMT, 21 December 1991. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-91-248, 24 December 1991): 8.

<sup>230</sup>"Czechs Sanction Oil Pipeline From Germany" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 1714 GMT, 4 February 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-026, 7 February 1992): 6.

<sup>231</sup>"Czechs Sanction Oil Pipeline From Germany" (excerpt), Prague Hospodarske Noviny in Czech, 5 February 1992. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-026, 7 February 1992): 6. The pipeline is expected to cost nine billion korunas, but if used to capacity it should pay for itself in fifteen years.

For Poland there is the additional option of importing oil through its Baltic ports. On the whole, however, it still appears mutually advantageous for both Russia and East Central Europe to keep oil flowing between the regions. Of course, Russia should not base its entire economy on the export of a single natural resource, but at present it seems that the efficient management of its oil industry will help improve its foreign trade standing.

## E. CONCLUSION

In the post-Warsaw Pact era, Russia is caught between two competing interests in its economic relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. On the one hand, there is the historical Russian trend of using economics as merely another means of controlling satellite nations. On the other hand, there is the ever present realization that the key to Russian internal stability is economic development. At the same time, the Russians realize there is a profound relationship between domestic stability and international security.<sup>232</sup> Given the decline in the Russian economy and the struggling economies in East Central Europe, it is certainly in their mutual interest to develop economic relations.

In addition, the future of trade with East Central Europe may mean the very future of Russian relations with all of Europe. For centuries East Central Europe has formed the bridge over which Russia received its Western influence. These influences have not

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<sup>232</sup>Major M. Pogovelyy, "Round Table on Foreign Threat, Persian Gulf" (text), Moscow *Krasnaya Zvezda* in Russian, 28 June 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-130, 8 July 1991): 64.



always been wanted, and close proximity to the West has often been regarded as a danger, but that closeness has nevertheless influenced Russian history. With Russia's western borders now some 800 miles further east, those influences may disappear. Because the borders are further away, trade ties remain one of the few means of maintaining contact. Whether Russia remains a strong military power in the region or whether it is supplanted by Ukraine remains to be seen, but in the near term its economic capability remains the best way of exerting its influence in the region.

However, Russia still has a national interest in East Central Europe; an interest in maintaining the security of its borders while it concentrates on internal reform. Admittedly, with an independent Ukraine between Russia and the East Central European nations there seems little point in considering that region as a buffer. However, one must realize that to many Russians there cannot and will not be a Ukraine separate from Russia. To them, East Central Europe is the frontier with the West. Without Russian troops stationed in the region the only means of influencing Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish policy is through trade; especially natural resources.

East Central Europe, on the other hand, finds itself in a difficult position. For them, continued trade at this point is still a necessity. This is so not just for the fact that Russian energy is vital to East Central European industry, but also because there is a great untapped market for East Central European goods in Russia. Perhaps the importance of this point was best stated by the director of the office of the Czechoslovak minister of

foreign trade when he said, "Our interest in trade with the Soviet Union is absolutely not declining. That would be economic suicide."<sup>233</sup>

In the forty plus years of Soviet domination, Eastern Europe as a whole suffered from slow or stagnated economic growth. Although East Central Europe was much better off than either Bulgaria or Romania, they were nevertheless unable to grow at the same rate as Western Europe. Nearly fifty years after the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland find themselves among the ranks of developing nations. For that reason alone they have every right to turn their backs on their former colonial masters.

But like many former colonies, the ties to the "mother country" are still strong. These ties will not be overcome overnight. Nor should they. Nevertheless, both Russia and East Central Europe stand to gain from continued economic association. In the New World Order it seems likely that economic power will mean as much if not more than military power. For Russia and East Central Europe the future of their mutual security lies in building a strong economy. On the surface, a stronger economy will lead to greater political stability. There is no doubt that if the population is effectively employed and able to provide for their basic needs, the government will be able to operate smoothly and without being distracted by domestic upheaval. At the same time, economic development will encourage better relations throughout Europe through increasing trade ties.

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<sup>233</sup>"Government Official Defends Trade With USSR" (excerpt), Bratislava Pravda in Slovak, 22 February 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-90-039, 27 February 1990): 10.

V  
CONCLUSION:  
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE  
AFTER THE WARSAW PACT

*La Russie ne boude pas, elle se recueille.* -- Prince Alexander M. Gorchakov<sup>234</sup>

Russia has been unified for a long time in her greatness and her national unity. Her territorial security is perfectly in order due to her defensive resources and to the lessons she has given invaders. What is now necessary is the development of her internal life, her productive resources, her prosperity, her culture, her commerce, her industry -- all things which require peace. Her foreign policy should thus be purely preventative and defensive. -- A.G. Jomini<sup>235</sup>

In his 1987 book *Perestroika*, former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev outlined his view of the Soviet Union's place in a new Europe. In his book he saw the Soviet Union as one "apartment" in a "Common European Home." His argument emphasized the common cultural and historical roots shared by the Russians and the other European peoples as a basis for future relations between them. There is some truth, although slight, to what he said, but it appears that his main goal was to prevent the Soviet Union from being excluded from Europe.<sup>236</sup> This is not to say that his theme fell upon deaf ears. Indeed, he admits he first discussed

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<sup>234</sup>"Russia does not sulk, it draws together." Prince Gorchakov was Russian Foreign Minister, 1856-1882.

<sup>235</sup>Aleksandr Genrikhovich Jomini (1814-1888), son of the famous general Antoine Henri Jomini, was a senior official in the Russian Foreign Ministry in the 1870s and 1880s.

<sup>236</sup>Ole Wæver, "Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian," *International Security* 66 (July 1990): 482.

his ideas with French President François Mitterrand in 1985, but the dream of a United States of Europe is as old as the nation-state system itself.<sup>237</sup> Given the age old desire for European unity Gorbachev believed the Soviet Union would be the chief architect of the Common Home.

Now, five years after the publication of *Perestroika*, Gorbachev is in semi-retirement and the country he ruled no longer exists. As a result of the breakup of the Soviet empire, the map of Europe has been redrawn, adding many more "apartments" to Europe with the independence of former Soviet republics. Gorbachev's dream of a major Soviet role in shaping the new European system has vanished and any subsequent aspirations of Russian involvement are seriously in doubt. After suffering a major ideological defeat with the collapse of Soviet communism and a major political defeat with the collapse of its empire, Russia finds itself rapidly abandoned by its former allies and sister republics of the Union. As the European republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as the nations of East Central Europe, rush to join with the states of Western Europe, Russia is increasingly faced with the prospect of European isolation. Russia's main goal in its European foreign policy in the 1990s is to avoid this isolation.

Is European isolation bad for Russia? Most certainly, for Russia is faced not only with political, but economic isolation as well. The leadership of Russia, as well as that

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<sup>237</sup> As early as 1800, the Abbé de Pradt (Dominique de Fourt de Pradt) called Europe a "single social body which one might rightly call the European Republic," which resembled on a large scale what Germany, at the time, represented on a smaller scale. Gulick, 11.

of East Central Europe, recognizes that the greatest threat to their security, and to European security in general, is civil unrest in the former Soviet Union. The major source of that unrest is the economic displacement caused by the collapse of the Soviet economy. For Russia, economic hardship and subsequent recovery are complicated by the fact that it has taken on the bulk of the foreign financial obligations of the old Soviet Union which threatens to drain scarce resources desperately needed at home. In an interdependent world, economic isolation from Europe can only encourage and hasten the very internal upheaval many leaders believe they must prevent.

The key to Russia's position as a member of the European system rests on its relationship with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. These three states are key to Russian interests in Europe not only because of their geographic position in the center of Europe, but, perhaps most importantly, because of their economic potential. While Russian ties to the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions, as well as the other major industrialized nations, particularly Germany and the U.S., are important to its economic and political development, it cannot rely solely on loans and aid from these countries and institutions to salvage Russia's internal system. Russia must also find the means to stimulate its own economic growth and political restructuring. Russia can learn policies and programs that stand a chance of success from the experiences of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. This is particularly true in the transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Of all the former WTO satellites of the Soviet Union, the three East Central European states have shown the

greatest economic recovery. By no means are Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland without economic difficulties, and much remains to be done before all of their problems are solved, but the EC decision to allow associate membership for these countries illustrates the strides the East Central European nations have made on the road to economic recovery.

However, the very symbols of East Central European success may mean isolation for Russia. The region's mad dash to "rejoin the West" is rapidly closing off any opportunity Russia may have to capitalize on improved economic relations with the West. The possibility of isolation is particularly true in the economic realm, but East Central European overtures to NATO may have similar implications. Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish insistence in joining NATO may imply hostility toward Russia, particularly since there are some in Russia who still see NATO as inherently anti-Russian. Despite East Central European statements to the contrary, as the region moves closer to NATO the more likely East Central Europe will appear to be a buffer zone between Russia and the West. The existence of a *cordon sanitaire* not only implies a severing, or at least a limiting, of relations between the regions, but also that Russia is an enemy. The NATO nations may only be concerned with their security in the event of civil unrest in the former Soviet Union, but the message received in Moscow may be quite different. To Russia such a situation could only be regarded as a move to block Russian participation in the European system.

While the East Central European nations may be resisting the establishment of a buffer zone in the region, they are equally adamant concerning the economic prospects of trade with the West. Nowhere is this more evident than in Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish relations with the EC. While trade ties with the EC are a boon for East Central Europe, those ties threaten to undermine Russian economic recovery. This is particularly true since the state of the Russian economy suggests it will not be offered even associate membership in the EC any time soon. Russia suffers from the fact that decreased EC tariffs on East Central European goods favor trade with the EC over trade with Russia. In addition, as East Central Europe becomes incorporated into the EC, EC tariffs will apply to Russian goods. Therefore, increased ties with the EC favor trade with the West at the expense of trade with Russia. At the same time, East Central European efforts to arrange alternate sources of energy indicate their dependency on Russian energy will not last forever.

While the prospects are good that Russia is on the road to European isolation, the entire process will take time. In fact, Russian isolation will not be complete until the East Central European nations become full members of the EC. Until that time, Russia still has an opportunity to take full advantage of Western technology and influence to enhance Russian internal reform.

Russia cannot avoid isolation through its security ties with East Central Europe alone. Indeed, Russia's security must incorporate treaties with the newly independent Soviet republics of Belarus' and Ukraine. In fact, it is equally important for Russia to ensure

that domestic reforms in those nations are as successful as its own. However, at the moment, Russia's current arrangements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland satisfy its immediate security concern in Europe; i.e., stabilizing the frontier. On the other hand, these same arrangements do nothing to improve Russia's internal woes and, in reality, only guarantee that its domestic state will remain free of unwanted external interference. By themselves, the bilateral security treaties, while forming a foundation for friendly relations and future cooperation, do not provide Russia the tools it needs to conduct internal reform; namely trade and economic growth.

Therefore, Russia's focal point for East Central European relations must be in the realm of economic development and mutual trade. Not only can Russia benefit monetarily from trade with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, but it can certainly benefit from the lessons gained from East Central European economic recovery.<sup>238</sup>

Of course, Russia does have options in its foreign economic relations with East Central Europe. On the one hand, Russia can use its remaining economic contacts with the region, especially energy, as a means of coercion. At this point, given East Central Europe's slow pace in discovering alternative sources to Russian energy, Russia does have an important foreign policy weapon at its disposal. Indeed, in an era in which former

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<sup>238</sup>In this regard, in a December 1991, interview, Hungarian Prime Minister Antall said, "It would be very stupid for us to underestimate the vast potential of the...Russian [market]. In time your economic situation will return to normal, I am sure, and, I repeat, we are prepared to help this along through our own experience... F. Lukyanov, "Hungary's Antall on Union Ties" (text), Moscow *Izvestiya* in Russian, 7 December 1991. Trans. by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-91-237, 10 December 1991), 9.



Soviet, now Russian, troops are withdrawing from the region, energy supplies remain Russia's only remaining means of affecting policy in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. However, as the East Central European nations find additional sources of energy, Russia may be able to cause some inconvenience in the region through energy policy, but its leverage will be drastically decreased.

Another foreign trade issue between Russia and East Central Europe which Russia could use to its advantage is the question of Russian and Soviet foreign debt to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Defaulting or postponing payment of the Russian debt would cause economic disaster in the region. Such an economic weapon might be quite enticing to a desperate Russia. However, what can Russia gain from such an intentional act which would far outweigh its costs? Quite simply -- nothing. With billions of dollars in foreign loans pending and the prospect of billions (perhaps even hundreds of billions) more in the future, Russia could not afford the impression that it is a bad credit risk. In short, foreign credit and loans are far too important to Russian economic reform and recovery at this point to risk losing them for any reason.

Russia's other option in foreign economic relations with East Central Europe is to encourage continued, and certainly increased, trade with the region. Only through trade will Russia's economy improve and its internal reforms succeed. The millions of dollars in foreign loans will aid in establishing a stable foundation for economic growth, but Russia's economic recovery cannot rest solely on the good will of the governments of the major industrialized nations. Indeed, as the major economic powers come to grips with

their own internal problems, less money will be available for improving Russia's economy. The German government, for example, increasingly confronts the fact that unification will consume much more effort and treasure than many believed in the rush of 1990. Indeed, in a 5 May 1992 speech at the United Nations, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated that his country had "reached the limit" of its capacity to help the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe make the transition to democracy and a market economy. The rising costs of unification have placed increasing strain on the German budget. In addition, Germany has already promised \$47 billion to the former Soviet Union and another \$65 billion to Eastern Europe (most of this amount is going to the areas of the former German Democratic Republic) -- more than any other nation. In his speech, Kohl called upon the other major industrialized nations, particularly Japan, to contribute more to Eastern European recovery, indicating Germany was nearing the end of its rope.<sup>239</sup> At the same time, recent events in the U.S. have called attention to underlying domestic concerns which may refuse to be ignored any longer. In addition, rising domestic sentiment that America has done enough to aid Europe threaten to hamper funding of additional Russian aid.

Faced with the prospect that foreign economic assistance may be limited in the future, as well as the fact that only through increased markets for exported goods can its economy improve, Russia must seek to improve trade ties with all nations. For the time

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<sup>239</sup>Paul Lewis, "Kohl Presses Japan to Do More to Assist East European Lands," The New York Times, 6 May 1992, A1.

being, Russia still has existing trade ties with East Central Europe, but these are rapidly dwindling. Increasingly Germany is taking Russia's place as the major trade partner with the East Central European nations. However, there are still opportunities for trade. There are Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish goods which do not sell in the West, but do sell in Russia. There is also the prospect of agricultural trade.

One means of encouraging the development of trade between East Central Europe and Russia is through Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier's "Triangular Plan." The plan, first presented at Harvard University in May 1990, calls for Western subsidies for Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish exports to the former Soviet republics.<sup>240</sup> Dienstbier presented the plan again at the 22 January 1992 opening of the international aid conference for the former Soviet Union. Dienstbier, as well as Hungarian and Polish officials, argued that the plan helps both East Central Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union. As Polish President Walesa stated later in the day, "What good is it if the West helps only Poland" and allows the former Soviet Union to destabilize the whole region by descending into chaos?<sup>241</sup> The plan was accepted by the conference on 24 January and one-quarter of EC credit for the CIS, 500 million ECU (about \$600 million), is earmarked for sales from the East Central European nations.<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>240</sup>"'Triangular Plan' Accepted" (text), Prague CSTK in English, 2037 GMT, 24 January 1992. FBIS Daily Report, Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU-92-017, 27 January 1992), 10.

<sup>241</sup>Barbara Koulik and Wladyslaw Minkiewicz, "EE Plan for Aid to Ex-USSR," RFE/RL Daily Report, 23 January 1992.

<sup>242</sup>"'Triangular Plan' Accepted," 10.

However, this plan is only a start. While Russia realizes there are opportunities for trade with East Central Europe, Russia cannot allow those opportunities to be dictated by outside forces. Indeed, if Russia surrenders the initiative on trade issues it runs the risk of limiting its economic growth to only those goods currently desired by its trade partners. Limiting Russia's exports to only a few goods, particularly energy and other raw materials, may be beneficial in generating hard currency reserves to repay foreign debt in the near term, but this policy does nothing to improve the vast number of other industries slowly being driven into idleness. Russia must find additional products with which to trade in order to rebuild its domestic economy. If its industry is allowed to stagnate, the internal dissent which many fear will become a reality threatening to spill over its borders into other parts of Europe. Severe internal instability can only ensure the isolation of Russia to prevent the spread of unrest. At the moment trade with East Central Europe offers the best means of generating the economic growth necessary to improve overall social conditions within Russia.

The importance of Russian economic policy in East Central Europe to the U.S. is clear. As long as the U.S. sees overall European security as a part of its national interest, it is imperative that Russia not be allowed to descend into social and economic turmoil. In this regard it is in the U.S. interest to ensure that the Russian national interest in East Central Europe be acknowledged and protected. Russian internal reform must be allowed to succeed otherwise Yeltsin will not last. A known Boris Yeltsin, good or bad, is better than an unknown who might very likely be a Russian neo-imperialist. Obviously, one

might argue that this mentality motivated continued support for Gorbachev even after it was apparent that he was no longer of any political consequence. However, when it became evident after August or September 1991, that Gorbachev was more a hinderance than a help to Soviet reform, there was a viable, acceptable alternative in Boris Yeltsin. At this point in time, some six months after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there are no acceptable alternatives to Yeltsin, although there are dissenting voices in Russia. Among the most outspoken of Yeltsin's critics are Aleksandr Rutskoi and Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Neither of these would-be contenders for the Russian presidency can be tolerated, both representing a right wing segment calling for the re-establishment of Russia's pre-December 1991 borders (i.e., the borders of the old Soviet Union) or, as in Zhirinovsky's case, the pre-1917 borders, which would include Finland and parts of Poland.<sup>243</sup>

However, acknowledging the Russian national interest in East Central Europe does not imply sacrificing the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The return of Russian hegemony in the region is just as likely to cause Russian isolation from Europe as the decline of Russian internal stability. Instead, what is required is an understanding that Russian internal reform is linked to its ties with the West through its natural bridge in Central Europe. In this regard it is equally important for the U.S. to disavow its Cold War mentality. At this point, Russia does not have the political or

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<sup>243</sup> Although Zhirinovsky has renounced this position, there are likely still others who make the same claim.

economic wherewithal to occupy its former East European dominions. Chief among its goals domestically is the establishment of stable political, social, and economic institutions. Its chief foreign policy aims are to ensure those institutions are successfully built. At the moment there can be no room for foreign adventurism. Whether or not Russia returns to its old ways once its internal house is in order is a matter of speculation, but even in that event the initial targets would likely be the Slavic republics of Belarus' and Ukraine.

Therefore it is in the interest of the U.S. to ensure Russia's reform process is successful. In achieving that interest it is important that the U.S. prevent the isolation of Russia from Europe. There are several ways of approaching this goal. In general, the U.S. should encourage Russian participation in established European multinational organizations. Certainly Russia will figure strongly in the ongoing Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) process by virtue of its large stockpiles of weaponry, but that is not enough. Indeed, there are already those in Russia who criticize NATO's motives. They see NATO asking Russia to cut its armaments while NATO countries maintain current levels which go beyond what is necessary for their defense.<sup>244</sup> Russia must not feel that it is being treated like a defeated power, as Germany was at the end of World War I. During the interwar period German political isolation and pressing economic woes led to the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis -- this cannot be allowed to happen in Russia. However, Russia must be allowed to participate in other organizations where its input is

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<sup>244</sup>Baryshev, 5.

sought to solve greater European problems. Obviously, CSCE fits this purpose, although that organization's effectiveness is questionable. However, CSCE does offer an opportunity for Russia to participate in greater European issues. Another avenue of Russian participation is the NACC.

Economically, the U.S. should encourage the continuation and further development of trade ties between Russia and East Central Europe. The goal here is to begin to improve the Russian economy so that it, too, may be in a position to reasonably ask for EC membership. If trade is not adequately developed before East Central Europe becomes heavily integrated into the EC, then Russian isolation, and its negative effects, is a given.

In sum, the U.S. and the West are faced with two options in its treatment of post-Soviet Russia. On the one hand, Russia can be treated with the same disdain and harshness as the Allies treated Germany at the end of World War I. In this case, Russia, like Germany, is denied entry into the European system and is allowed to flounder in internal political and economic chaos as a new, Russian, Weimar Republic. The ultimate consequences of the interwar Allied policies were paid for with the lives of millions of Allied soldiers between 1941 and 1945.

On the other hand, Russia can be welcomed into the European community of nations, although slowly, and its internal structures rebuilt with Western aid. In other words, the West can model its treatment of Russia after that of Germany in the post-World War II period. Obviously, the treatment of Germany was largely dictated by the fact that it was occupied by Allied armies, but the point is that Germany was allowed into the family of

nations. Of the two options facing the West, this option certainly appears the most palatable.

For Russia there is only one real option in its foreign policy. It must secure the success of radical restructuring of its social, political, and economic system. This transformation will not come easy, but the shocks that are likely to occur can be eased through greater cooperation with the West. The key to its continued access to the West is through Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the frontier between East and West. Because of the importance of Western influence in Russia's reform process, the success or failure of its reforms hinge on successful relations with East Central Europe.



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